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Abstract 
 
  This thesis examines the link between independence referenda and minority nationalist 
discourses on immigration in Quebec, Catalonia, and Scotland. I demonstrate that the 
referendum period acts as lock-in mechanism that secures minority nationalist discourses 
towards immigration. Importantly, political frames used throughout the referenda play a role in 
the development of either an accepting or a sceptical narrative toward immigration. Through 
process tracing and discourse analysis, I note the development of a skeptical narrative toward 
immigration in Quebec, whereas I observe a more accepting or accommodating rhetoric in the 
Catalan and Scottish cases. The latter two cases extend beyond civic and ethnic studies of 
nationalism into an analysis of political mobilization by the sub-state nationalist parties 
throughout the referendum period.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 	
 
 Wealthy societies have witnessed rising immigration over the past several decades. In 
these regions, immigration has become an increasingly prominent political issue. This issue 
assumes different characteristics in multinational states, where the politics of immigration 
intersects with the politics of minority nations. In minority nations the nationalist movements 
have instrumentalized the question of immigration in order to facilitate the process of nation-
building.  In some cases, this instrumentalization has allowed newcomers to become a part of the 
national fabric, allowing political tensions that are sometimes found between locals and 
immigrants to ease. In others, it has facilitated tensions between the two groups.  
 In the past 20 years, sovereignty movements have intensified in Western multinational 
states. Quebec, and more recently Scotland and Cataloniai, have all held independence referenda. 
As a test to the national unity in the minority nations, immigrants were either framed as friend or 
foe during this politically turbulent period. This thesis examines the independence referenda 
process in sub-state nationalist regions (SSNRs) in Canada, Spain, and the United Kingdom in 
order to showcase how the process solidifies the discourse vocalized by political leaders of the 
nationalist parties. I test the hypothesis that the independence referendum process may act as 
lock-in mechanism that further solidifies minority discourses about immigrants that were 
articulated in prior nationalist frames. That is to say, referenda play a role in the development of 
either an accepting or a suspicious narrative toward immigration. In this thesis, I argue that 
without a referendum the relationship between the nationalist movement and immigrant 
communities would be more fluid. 
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 Importantly, the complex relationship between the central state, the sub-state nationalist 
regions, and the immigrant population has a causal effect on the discourse developed within 
each. The SSNR discourse toward immigrants is normally constructed in opposition to central 
government policies and discourses on immigration. Each minority nation uses immigration 
policy to further solidify the identity difference between the sub-state nation and the broader 
political community. Thus, as the United Kingdom becomes less welcoming toward immigrants, 
Scotland develops the opposite discourse toward immigration.  In Quebec, the policy of 
‘interculturalism’ was introduced as a way for Quebec to distinguish itself from Canadian 
multicultural policies consequently developing its own immigration narrative. In Catalonia, 
integration polices were implemented in response to the strict changes to Spanish immigration 
law in the year 2000. This, again, created a separate discourse with regards to immigration.  
 Nationalists have implemented the opposite of the central state immigration policy in 
order to build a separate national identity by emphasizing another dimension on which the 
minority nation is different. For instance, sub-state politics in Quebec and Catalonia focus on 
language while all three regions utilize a different narrative compared to the central government 
with regard to poltical economy. Quebec and Scotland have also developed differing strategies to 
the state on social policies.  Immigration policies and consequent discourse in each region have 
developed in a similar fashion, accompanying the other policies in the nationalist arsenal of 
nation-building policies and associated discourses. This dynamic constitutes the political 
background for this thesis, but is not explained by it. The issue of the constitution of minority 
national identity in opposition to the central state has been studied elsewhere (Barker, 2015; 
Jeram, 2014; Hepburn, 2011; and Beland and Lecours, 2008). Rather, I pick up where these 
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scholars leave off,  examining the link between referenda on independence and minority 
nationalist discourses on immigration. 
 If independence referenda ‘epitomise’ popular sovereignty (Guibernau et al., 2014), how 
do such nation-building efforts influence attitudes toward immigrants? I argue that the political 
elite activate attitudes towards immigration, which are consequently ‘locked-in’ by the 
referendum process.  I develop my argument through an investigation of the discourse and policy 
development of sub-state nationalist regions (SSNRs) toward immigrants during the referendum 
period. Through the use of process tracing, I argue that without a referendum the minority 
nationalist perceptions of immigrant communities would remain fluid, with greater possibility of 
fluctuation in political attitudes.  The immigrant community position on the referendum (in 
favour or against) may act as the mechanism that will lock in the minority nationalist discourses 
on immigrants. In other words, the independence referenda can be seen as lock-in mechanism 
that secure the immigrant identity frames presented by sub-state nationalist party elites.    
 This paper adds to the scholarship on nationalism in multinational states by incorporating 
a nuanced link in the causal chain; the lock-in mechanism created by the referendum process.  
The link between referenda and immigrant integration in SSNRs is understudied in existing 
scholarship. In fact, although other studies have focused on the conditions of diversity in 
multinational demacracies none have analyzed the referendum process as a determinant in 
discourse toward immigrant attitudes.  My study contributes not only to the study of nationalism 
in multinational states but also the study of immigrant integration and the study of discourse in 
politics.  
 Throughout the paper, I use several terms that require some conceptual clarification. The 
most frequent term is SSNRs, which I define as territorial units within sovereign states that 
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contain a large proportion of a minority nation and serve, either de facto or de jure, as homelands 
for those minority nations.  SSNRs wish to preserve their identity either through full sovereignty, 
or through enhanced self-government within the existing state framework. These regions will be 
referred throughout this work as either minority nations or sub-state nationalist regions (SSNRs).  
 The main parties found in these regions will be referred to as sub-state nationalist parties 
(SSNPs) (Jeram, 2014), or by their actual names in abbreviated form. In Catalonia, I examine the 
Convergence and Union Party (Convergència i Unió in Catalan (CiU)); in Quebec, the Parti 
Québécois (PQ); and in Scotland, the Scottish National Party (SNP).  I use both the terms 
‘central government’ and the ‘multinational state’ (or even just state) interchangeably throughout 
the text to mean the same thing. 
1.1 Immigrants and Minority Nations: The Framework 	
 Many scholars offer theoretical insight into how immigrants and minority nations affect 
each other. Zapata –Barrero summarizes the commonly expressed arguments about this 
relationship in seven basic premises,ii four of which are relevant here (2007). First, as immigrants 
tend to integrate into the majority community this undercuts the demographic position of 
minority nations.  Second, the preceding point warrants the increase in minority nationalist 
demands for control over immigration policy, thus providing another dimension to demands for 
self-government. Third, although some demands between nationalists and immigrants may be 
contentious they could also share similar interests. This occurs when a convergent conception of 
a minority nation arises, i.e. if the self-government capable of being multicultural or if there is 
willingness on part of immigrant to adapt to cultural aspects within the region.  
 Fourth, and ultimately, the most relevant for the development of my research question, 
Carens, and Baubock question whether both immigrants and minority nations are at a 
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disadvantage in relation to the state (2001). During independence referenda, the cultural demands 
of minority nations and immigrants become increasingly intertwined and their potential 
differences increasingly salient. Thus, examining the referenda serves to understand if diversity 
under stress will allow for a cohesive vision for self-determination or, as the scholarship alludes, 
will their situation ‘worsen’ as their cultural demands will be at odds with one another.  
  Independence referenda are critical moments in the political aspirations for self-
determination, in which the cultural demands of the minority nations and immigrants intersect. 
The independence referendum represents a time for solidarity in the political community and a 
time to highlight ‘commonness’ regardless of ethnicity where both immigrants and nationalists 
can show its attachment to “a clearly demarcated territory” (Guibernau, 1999: 14). In other 
words, an independence referendum is important to nationalist imagery and emancipation from 
the central state. This historical moment highlights the cultural demands complicated by the 
relationship that exists between the multinational state, the sub-state, and immigrants, especially 
as immigrants typically show greater commitment to the norms of the dominant state culture.  
 Indeed, immigrant behaviour in this particular instance is more important than during 
times of ‘normal politics’, as it is an opportunity to show allegieance to the minority  nation. 
Existing literature highlights that identity conflicts intensify when immigration is discussed more 
frequently throughout political discourse — as it is during the referendum (Bohman, 2011; 
Howard, 2009; and Zapata-Barrero and Garces-Mascarenas, 2010).  My analysis highlights that 
during the Catalan and Scottish referenda, minorities were perceived as supportive to the 
sovereignty movement by nationalist party leaders. Therefore, one might hypothesize that 
subsequent minority-nation discourse should develop in ways sympathetic to the immigrant 
communities. Within Quebec, on the other hand, some politicians faulted Anglophone and 
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immigrant minorities within the province for hindering the sovereignty movement. This altered 
the relationship between immigrants and minority nationalists after the referendum and 
contributes to a more mistrustful nationalist discourse toward immigrants.  
 Existing scholarship highlights the complex relationship between the multinational state, 
sub-state nationalist movements, and immigrants, offering valuable insight for the 
conceptualization of the causal chain explained in this thesis. Moreover, in response to state 
policies, many minority nations have re-conceptualized citizenship in order to construct a 
‘regional citizenship’ based on rights, participation and membership at the regional level 
(Hepburn, 2011). Indeed, who does or does not belong to a region has become a highly salient 
issue and becomes particularly more so during the independence referendum. This thesis 
complements arguments made by these scholars and fills an important lacuna in the literature by 
introducing a link in an existing causal chain between the actions of the central government, the 
SSNR oppositional policies, and political discourse directed toward immigrants.  
 This thesis emphasizes political party discourses because they are the key to 
understanding how actors in nationalist contests create or change identities through political 
framingiii. I utilize discursive institutionalism (DI) to observe the discourse employed throughout 
a period of potential institutional change; the independence referendum.  Exploring institutional 
change through a discursive perspective better equips researchers to highlight how actors in 
various institutional settings can transform established “interests, institutional obstacles and 
cultural impediments to change” (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 207) with contemporary ideas. As 
such, it is advantageous to analyze discourse through the referendum period as both institutional 
change and ideational frames may be created.  
 Current works on discourse and nationalism highlight the benefits of using discourse 
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analysis. Individual nationalisms are defined by a ‘particular content’ that creates and circulates 
its general culture and values through political ideological discourse (Finlayson, 1998). Indeed, 
discourse analysis links the production of national identity to broader political discourses 
(Finlayson, 1998). In this same regard, the literature shows how the politics of immigration 
becomes more salient when differences are discussed within political communities (Zappata-
Barrero and Garces-Mascarenas, 2010; Agrela, 2002; and Bohman, 2011) as discourse analysis 
uncovers the impact of these discussions on intrastate relationships.   
 Elite discourse can shape the way political actors or groups are framed among members 
of the targeted society. Much of the literature on framing seeks to understand under which 
conditions certain frames are created and politicized.  For instance, Howard highlights that the 
creation of liberal policies by the political elite may be blocked when far-right movements 
activate (or frame) anti- immigrant public attitudes during public referenda (2009). The way in 
which the political elites frame events or policies shape behaviours and attitudes within the 
region, influencing what is considered as appropriate behaviour and procuring desired political 
outcomes (Falleti and Lynch, 2009).   
             In each of the three cases considered in this thesis, I focus on the independence 
referendum process to understand the perception that the minority nationalist movements 
develop toward immigrants (accepting and accommodating, or suspicious and 'integrative'). I 
examine how the minority nationalist interpretation that, because of immigrant 'behaviour' during 
the referendum, they either are or aren't a feasible partner in sub-state nation-building process 
becomes a causal mechanism. The question is one of their potential to be 'integrated' within the 
minority nation or the broader state-wide nation. The relationship with the multinational state, in 
each case, is examined as it has broader implications on how discourses and policies directed 
		 8	
towards the immigrant populations are developed by the nationalist movement. Ultimately, each 
case study allows me to analyze what happens because of the referendum.  
            Without the independence referendum in the SSNRs it is difficult to say with any 
certainty whether or not subsequent policies in the regions, such as reasonable accommodation in 
Quebec, would have been adapted. Subsequent policy development in Scotland and Catalonia 
has yet to be evaluated as the referenda concluded in 2014 and 2015. Nevertheless, it cannot be 
known how attitudes would have developed without the discourse built around the immigrant 
integration throughout the referendum and their participation (particularly in Scotland) in the 
referendum process.  
            In order to evaluate the hypothesized causal argument, I first analyze the policies that 
were made in responses to state’s policies by the SSNRs. Second, I analyze government 
documents produced by the CiUiv, PQ, and SNP, as well as political speeches by their parties’ 
main advocates to determine how immigrants were framed in the independence referendum 
process.  Finally, I analyze what policies were made after the referendum in the case of Quebec 
as a result of ‘locked-in’ nationalist perception of immigration, while predicting the similar 
outcomes for the other two cases. The analysis of these cases requires process-tracing 
methodology, normally deployed to assess the causal effect of ideas (Bennett, 2010).  
            This thesis is divided into seven chapters.  In Chapter two, I provide an overview of 
the existing literature, how it contributes to my project and what I expect to add with my 
argument. In Chapter three, I outline the theoretical and methodological considerations for the 
project showcasing the theoretical development of the referendum as a lock-in mechanism.  In 
Chapters 4-6, I explore each case study through a qualitative examination of secondary sources, 
media sources, policy documents, and the discursive and anecdotal examples by the SSNPs 
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political elites and immigrant groups. I conclude the project in Chapter 7 by offering an overview 
of the argument and the main findings. I also discuss the limitations of the study and implications 
for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 	
 This literature review begins by defining nationalism in order to understand how it is 
used contemporarily by SSNRs in Catalonia, Quebec and Scotland. Following this, I outline the 
literature on contemporary nation- building practices and tools while drawing on important 
works in Discursive Institutionalism in order to examine the process of framing in each of the 
three cases studied. I conclude the section by discussing the relevance of political framing and 
articulation.  The literature review provides the necessary background for the premise of my 
main argument that referendum creates a lock-in mechanism on immigrant discourse in minority 
nations. 
 Traditionally, many scholars defined nationalism in civic or ethnic terms.  Commonly, 
civic nationalism is described as a shared citizenship or political rights regardless of one’s 
ethnicity, race, or language, whereas ethnic nationalism is supposed to be rooted in one’s 
inherited ethnicity. Scholars have extended the civic/ethnic definitions by introducing a post-
ethnic nationalism (Kymlicka, 2001) adapted by regions if they have control over the terms of 
diversity in their respective communities, such as the number of immigrants entering their 
region. Certainly, the way in which a nation perceives newcomers may be affected by the 
definition of nationalism under which they fall. In this thesis, I adopt Smith’s definition of 
nationalism as ‘an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and 
identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential 
nation’ (2001:9). This is the clearest, most relevant definition with regard to the three SSNRs, as 
all three regions seek to attain greater autonomy through independence referenda.  
 Minority nation-building practices have moved beyond their traditional, exclusionary 
molds in order to encapsulate a more current ‘nation’. Nationalist efforts continuously adapt to 
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the changing political demands and discourse, so as to meet the demands of their nation-building 
project. Contemporarily, minority regions are host to various layers of diversity, including class, 
gender, generational, race, ethnic and nationalists. Therefore, national identity can be ‘aspectival’ 
as its form is shaped by the angle through which one observes it (Tully, 1995: 13).  Further, 
modern nation-building politics have changed the concept of citizenship due to factors, such as 
European integration and the decentralization of power (Hepburn, 2011; and Jeram, 2014). 
Accordingly, while regions are influenced by diversity, they are also affected by relational 
comparisons to the multinational state in which they are found. For example, identity in Quebec 
may be created through comparisons with the ‘rest of Canada.’ National identity within Quebec 
may not be exclusive or progressive toward migrants but exists as a result of the differing 
national identities within the region itself (Barker, 2010). 
 The institutional context and experiences of minority nations may affect attitudes towards 
immigration. Barker examines the intersection between the 'new' diversity from immigration and 
the 'old' politics of sub-state nationalism (2015). She highlights how the sub-state response to 
immigration is created by three factors: institutional and power arrangement of the multilevel 
state; how the leaders perceive immigrants to be impacting national autonomy goals; and the 
nation-building process. Jeram analyzes diversity and its subsequent policies as new marker of 
national identity and/or as a tool in the nation building process for SSNPs (2014). This link 
between the use of public policies and identity-building in SSNRs is not new, and it has been 
studied in relation to other policy areas that are usually not considered inherently identity based, 
such as social and economic policy (Beland and Lecours, 2012).   
 The literature highlights a growing trend in the politics of minority nationalism to utilize 
immigration as a nation–building tool. Sub-state national regions do not necessarily view 
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immigration as a threat, but manipulate it to the region’s advantage (Zapata-Barrero, 2013). Sub-
state nationalists parties wish to differentiate from the central state parties and many of them 
have become ‘modern and forward looking’ (Keating, 2001; and Guibernau, 2013).  Minority 
nationalist movements are becoming much more sensitive to charges of exclusivist ethnic 
nationalism. They are, therefore, far more cautious in the type of rhetoric they employ, including 
toward migrants into their regions.  
  As already suggested, however, it is difficult to understand the politics of minority 
nation-building without linking that process with the politics of the central governments in 
multinational states. Scholars on diversity and multiculturalism in multinational states explore 
how the cultural demands of immigrants and minority nations interact. As noted, some of the 
scholarship is premised on the idea that the interests of immigrants and minority nations may 
conflict. This is so because immigrants arriving to the SSNRs may integrate into the majority 
community, thus undercutting the demographic position of minority nations (Carens, 2000; 
Kymlicka 2001; Baubock 2001; Zapata-Barrero, 2004a). This may intensify the political 
demands of the minority naitions. SSNPs may therefore try to position themselves in such a way 
as to channel immigration to the advantage of the nation-building project. Indeed, they may aim 
to tackle the issue proactively by incorporating immigrants as part of the minority nation.   
 This presumption offers a connection between the desire for increased capacity with 
regard to immigrant management for minority nations and their demands for self-government.  
Put differently, the reception to immigration by a community creates part of its ‘self-
understanding’ (Carens, 1995: 20) as views on immigration can be mirrored from individual 
opinions to societal views in general (Zapata-Barrero, 2004a; 2004b). Thus, policies influence 
this self-understanding as a minority region. Yet, as argued by those in the institutional 
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nationalism studies, this is only possible if a genuine self-government exists. Indeed, some view 
diversity management as one of the fundamentals that constitute the minority nations demands 
for self-government (Zapata-Barrero, 2004a; 2004b; and Carens, 1995) 
 As the foregoing discussion suggests, while the interests of immigrants and minority 
nations may be at odds, they do not have to be antagonistic. This is especially so if the immigrant 
community and the SSNPs have a convergent conception of the minority state (Zapata –Barrero, 
2007). For example, if the government of SSNR is capable of accepting diversity or if there is 
willingness on part of the immigrant to adapt to cultural aspects within the region that will 
contribute to the development of the SSNR’s project.  This variable dynamic is an important one 
when it comes to the minority nationalisms of Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland. In these regions 
nationalism no longer focuses on a ‘consensual identity’ but is maintained through the 
participation and interaction between the diverse residents in the region (Maclure, 2003).  This is 
not to say that all regions are inclusive of immigrants but that how immigrants contribute to 
sovereignty movements may impact how sovereigntists frame them in the referendum period.  
 Additionally, despite the ‘disadvantaged’ situation both immigrants and minority nations 
face in relation to the state, some question whether this situation worsens when the two 
communities’ concerns are linked, such as during a referendum (Carens, 2001; 1995; and 
Baubock, 2001).  Some scholars argue that such ‘linked’ interactions can produce bonds between 
citizens, which may lead to positive deliberation between immigrants and minority nationalists 
(Maclure, 2003; Gagnon and Tully, 2001). Others stipulate that the more ‘intertwined’ the 
cultural demands of minority nations and immigrants become, the more opportunity there is for 
contention to arise between them (Zapata –Barrero, 2007).  Overall, the literature seems to 
present that as long as the cultural demands of minority nations and immigrant are able to 
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maintain a similar attachment to the goals of self-determination of the former, there will be little 
contention between the two groups.   
 At the same time, many studies of nationalist politics in multinational states add that 
current state immigration policies do not allow the tools or resources for the SSNR to manage 
itself, affecting its ability to develop as a cultural community. This impedes its ability to foster an 
appropriate environment for immigrant integration.  Scholars have long recognized the role of 
the state in the regulation of immigration streams and their integration (Brubaker, 1992; Castles 
and Miller, 1993; Geddes, 2003; Lahav, 2004; Massey et al., 2002; Sassen, 1996; 1999; Zolberg, 
2006), while other research has explored the extent to which the state, through its institutions, 
also influences societal attitudes toward immigration. In the same regard, studies on immigrant 
attitudes in the sub-state regions are also valuable. Studies on structural influences examine how 
the state can establish the confines for the interactions between citizens and newcomer they also 
play a vital role in forming inter-ethnic relations. Zamora –Kapoor, for instance, offers structural 
account to explain that states establish the confines for the interactions between citizens and 
newcomers, thereby also playing a vital role in forming inter-ethnic relations (2013).  
 Studies in social psychology provide additional insights into the possible relations 
between minority nationalists and immigrants in their midst. Intergroup Contact Theory (Allport, 
1954; Pettigrew, 1997; Escandell and Ceobanu, 2009) predicts that people who share similar 
goals and statuses, and collaborate with and support elites are seen as part of the same group. 
Marginality theory (Fossett and Kiecolt, 1989; Bobo and Kluegel, 1993; Fetzer, 2000a; 2000b) 
provides insight into the connection between national identity and immigrant exclusion. 
Marginality theory is premised on the idea that oppressed (such as minority nationalists in a 
multinational state) groups will be more sympathetic to others (immigrants) because of their own 
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marginalization experience.  Indeed, both of these theories are relevant to this thesis and connect 
further to the institutional premises brought forth by Carens, Kymlicka and Baubock. If these 
‘disadvantaged’, marginalized groups have shared goals and collaborate in their obtainment, 
then, according to current scholarship their relationship should be congenial. Yet, this is not 
always the case. Therefore, while institutional and social theories provide insight into the causal 
chain explained here, they fail to fully explain the development of immigrant attitudes in each 
case.  We need to turn our attention to specific discursive practices via which structural features 
of the context are translated into particular political dynamics. For this reason, many scholars 
have incorporated discursive practices in order to understand the relationship between 
immigrants and the (sub) state.  
 A number of scholars have analyzed the way attitudes develop toward immigrant 
integration through the use of discourse analysis (Finlayson, 1998; Agrela, 2002; O’Connor, 
2006).  Importantly, many in this tradition emphasize the construction of the ‘other’ by the elite.  
These frames are produced through political discourse, in which specific actors or groups can be 
framed as either friendly or threatening, or any variation of these.  Political discourse 
characterizes immigrants as either a ‘threats’ or an ‘allies’ to the independence movement and, 
therefore, they are framed as ‘threats’ or ‘allies’ to the cohesion of the sub-state national unit.  In 
other words an ‘us-versus-them’ dichotomy may be created through the use of political frames.  
Indeed, if the immigrant is framed as an enemy to the solidarity movement they are normally 
framed as such by the political elitesv.  
 Scholars of discursive politics depict frames that guide social practice (Butler, 1996; and 
Foucault, 1994), wherein elite discourse creates a certain image that can be ‘normalized’ through 
repetition and saliency (Balzacq, 2010; and Bohman, 2011), as would be the case in a time of 
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stress such as a referendum.  Further, some scholars highlight that human actions are regulated  
through habitus (Bourdieu, 1990), meaning that human beings are products of their environment. 
This habitus is created through the power of discourse (Balzacq, 2010).  Therefore, it is 
important to understand how discourse is used within institutions. Schmidt and Radaelli suggest 
that investigating institutional transformation through a discursive lens will equip researchers to 
better understand how actors in various institutional settings are able to change values, 
institutions, and cultural aspects with new ideas (2004).  
 This paper employs Discursive Institutionalism (DI) in order to examine the process of 
framing in each of the three cases studied. Discursive institutionalism (DI) is concerned about 
two factors in political science research: the communication of ideas (or frames) and the 
institutional setting through which frames are conveyed through discourse (Schmidt, 2010). DI 
extends beyond the constraints of traditional institutionalisms and views institutions as dynamic 
— in contrast to the other neo-institutionalisms, which define institutions as static wherein 
change is often brought about by external factors. Discursive Institutionalists views ideas as 
dynamic institutions (Schmidt, 2010; Hajer, 2003; and Fischer, 2003). 
 DI is a comprehensive term that encompasses a wide array of literature. On the one hand, 
some works examine the functional applicability of ideational research, which includes general 
work such as that of Schmidt (2008) and Mehta (2010), as well as the research of policy ideas 
and paradigms (Hall, 1989; and Berman, 1998) and work that discusses normative ideas through 
the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1989). On the other hand, further works 
investigate the ‘coordinative’ and the ‘communicative’, and/or ‘interactive’ processes, (Schmidt, 
2002) through which frames and ideas are expressed (or performed) through discourse. This 
thesis develops its arguments on the basis of the communicative processes of political elites 
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during the independence referenda in Quebec, Catalonia, and Scotland.  While this research 
focuses on a particular institution in alignment with HI it pays closer attention to the influence of 
discourse than is usually given by scholars in HI tradition. For many Historical Institutionalists 
(such as Lieberman, 2005; Beland, 2005; King, 1999; and Rothstein, 2003) HI and DI can fit 
easily together (Schmitt, 2008) as where HI provides the structural context, DI provides the 
ideational clarification.  
 For instance, Beland highlights how the incorporation of ideas into core assumptions will 
expose how the ideational process matters in the agenda setting process in policy-making 
institutions. In fact, ‘ideational forces can become an independent variable’ to determine the 
framing of policy alternatives and development (Beland, 2005:  2).  Beland stresses the 
importance of agenda-setting and policy paradigms that are framed by individual political actors 
(2005).  Political actors must rely on frames in order to garner support for the policies they put 
forth.  Thus, the discourse surrounding these policies and their alternatives merit attention as 
framing can impact all policy areas. King also incorporates ideas into his book on immigration 
policy in the UK and the US while heavily emphasized on the HI components his focus on the 
role of ideas and knowledge place his study closer to DI (1999). Further, scholars theorize that 
ideas are integral to problem-definition during the policy-making process (Beland, 2005). Such 
ideas can influence substantive aspects of the policy solution while motivating the political 
tactics elites may use in order to garner public support for their cause. Thus, ideas, expressed 
through political discourse, may expedite change by influencing public opinion and convincing 
interest groups and the public, that policy change is or is not necessary (Blyth, 2002; and 
Schmidt, 2002).   
		 18	
 Examining the independence referendum process as an important  political movement 
enables the research to uncover how, as an institutionvi, the  referendum constrains the actions of 
political actors inside of it while being “created and changed by [those same] actors” (Schmidt, 
2008). It is, therefore, the shared ideas, interpretations, and meaningful attachments that conduct 
human behaviour. Discourses are recognised as both the consequence and vehicle of human 
action (Hajer, 1995). This work adheres to the basic assumptions of DI as it accepts that 
“institutional dynamics originate from the emergence of new ideas, concepts and narratives in 
society that institutionalize in social practices and that affect social outcomes” (Arts and Buzier, 
2009: 340). Indeed, the institutional dynamics during the referendum period were created by 
frames and narratives articulated by the SSNPs with regard to immigrant attitudes.  
 As many sociologists have used framing to explain the process of social movements, the 
same logic can be applied to nationalist movements. Frames “operate by [re] activating 
information already at the recipients’ disposal” (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson, 1997: 225) which 
is to say, that the frame is not new, as it has already been constructed or perceived through 
another source but is reinforced through political articulation.  The literature highlights that 
political frames should be relevant to whom the message is intended (Snow, Tan, and Owens, 
2013). For instance, how minority nationalists frame immigrants during the referendum periods 
may depend on how immigrants align themselves in the process. An analysis of political frames 
is used to understand the referenda ‘lock-in’ mechanism as the literature associates political 
articulation with anti-immigrant attitudes.  Often the perceptions of immigrants are the result of 
context or of the images conveyed by the elites, as suggested by Bohman (2011). When main 
parties articulate certain frames, these perceptions of immigrants become activated and 
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normalized (Howard, 2009; Bohman, 2011). This literature provides the rationale for the 
examination of the SSNP elite discourse in the referendum process that I undertake in this thesis. 
 The scholarship on political articulationvii offers insight into the factors that influence 
anti- immigrant attitudes. Some studies suggest that political articulation may affect anti-
immigrant attitudes by influencing the visibility of immigrants within society.  If immigration 
becomes a salient political issue then prejudicial attitudes may arise due to increased visibility of 
the group. Allport stresses that visibility is a prerequisite for a minority group to become subject 
to negative perceptions (1954), evident in the referendum process. Moreover, some studies have 
shown that attitudes articulated by traditional parties have the most political impact (Bohman, 
2011) and that the perceptions of immigrants portrayed in public space activities and states are 
more influential when made by pertinent political actors (Blumer, 1958). Likewise, political 
articulation may solidify anti-immigrant attitudes into “the sphere of acceptance” (Bohman, 
2011; Rydgren, 2003; and Eatwell, 2003). In this regard, negative (and/or positive) attitudes can 
be normalized.  This will further be elaborated in the theory section of this paper, but is 
mentioned here, as it is crucial to understand that much of the literature supports the rationale 
behind the construction of the referendum as a lock-in mechanism. Indeed, political discourse 
has the power to create, change and lock in perceptions of immigrants in minority nations.   
 Examining institutional discourses has become a relatively ubiquitous approach in certain 
areas of contemporary political studies.  Some works depict how the foreign population is 
conceptualized in institutions of power through discourse of the elite. The manner in which 
political elites frame events or policies in institutions may model behaviours and attitudes within 
the region. This may normalize certain appropriate behaviours and procure desired political 
outcomes (Falleti and Lynch, 2009). Discourses produced through the differential process can 
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also create symbolic demarcation that integrates the foreigner (Agrela, 2002). Discourse offered 
by political elites forms the way certain individuals or groups are framed through political 
articulation and, as such, much of the literature on framing seeks to understand under which 
conditions certain frames are created and politicized.   
  Existing works on discourse and nationalism emphasize the benefits of incorporating 
discourse analysis into the study of nationalism.  Individual ‘nationalisms’ may be defined by a 
‘particular content’ that constitute and disperse its common cultural and values through political 
ideological discourse (Finlayson, 1998). Moreover, the scholarship demonstrates that identity 
conflicts become salient when immigration is discussed repeatedly throughout political discourse 
(as it would be during the referenda) (Zapata-Barrero and Garcés- Mascareñas, 2010; Agrela, 
2002; and Bohman, 2011). In fact, analytical overviews of national discourses on tolerance and 
cultural diversity reveal that politicians within diverse multinational state may avoid discussing 
immigration as it stirs up conflicts of identity (Zapata-Barrero and Garcés- Mascareñas, 2010). 
Thus, during periods of political stress, when identity divides become more salient, it is 
important to focus on the discourse of politicians in the SSNRs.  
 Other studies on nationalism highlight how rhetoric can ignite or diminish divides within 
regions or increase salient issues by investigating how and why certain discourses dominate 
independence movements. In some instances, elites advocate self-determination or devolution in 
the name of economic progress, whereas in other cases, self-determination movements may be 
based on ethnic identities (McCollom, Nowok, and Tidal, 2014; and Finlayson, 1998). Works on 
nationalist rhetoric compare a variety of attitudes from both the political elite to the public 
masses in order to illustrate the articulation of national identity by differing groups in different 
contexts through discourse analysis (Leith and Soule, 2011). Yet, few works have analyzed 
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discourse throughout the referendum period (see O’Connor 2006) and none have analyzed the 
impact of the discourse on the subsequent relationship between the minority nation and the 
immigrant population. My work contributes to the literature by incorporating a missing link in 
the determinants of nationalist attitudes towards immigrants in minority regions.  																																						
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Chapter 3: Theory and Methodology 	
 This thesis builds on the preexisting theoretical work that develops a complex causal 
chain whereby minority regions develop policies in response to the central government. The 
causal chain is illustrated in Figure 1. This section elaborates on the key elements of this causal 
chain and the assumptions that underpin it. It also outlines my own contribution, positing the role 
of independence referenda in the development of a lock-in mechanism. I argue that the discourse 
in minority regions toward immigrants is constructed in opposition to central government 
policies and discourses on immigration.  Therein, immigrant communities become more or less 
disposed towards independence,  and the political framing by the sub-state nationalist parties 
towards immigrant groups develops accordingly, creating a discursive feed-back loop thereafter.  
Figure 1: The development of a lock-in mechanism 
 
3. 1 Theoretical Assumptions   	
  Based on an extensive literature review, my work rests on four hypotheses which serve to 
develop the theory of referenda as a lock-in mechanism and the causal chain displayed above:  
1. Sub-state nationalists regions develop unique diversity policies in opposition to state 
immigration policies; therefore, diversity management becomes an important part in the nation-
building effort. 
Central	government	adopts	immigration	policy/stance	 Sub-state	nationalist	adopt	opposite	policy/stance	
Immigrants	become	more	or	less	favourable	to	nationalist	project	
Immigrants	support	or	oppose	independence	in	a	referendum	
Sub-state	nationalist	discourse	develops	accordingly	
Independence	Referendum	Process	solidiGies	preexisting	relations	between	nationalist	parties	and	immigrants		
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 Public policy has a dual purpose in SSNRs. It has the customary function of providing 
public goods, but it is also frequently used in order to build separate identity. Thus, public 
policies in these regions is often devised in opposition to the policies prevailing at the 
centre(Barker, 2015; Jeram, 2014; Hepburn, 2011; and Beland and Lecours, 2008). Immigration 
and integration policies serve a similar function.  This premise highlights the first  point on the 
causal path analysed, the role these policies play in the development of nationalist discousre 
towards immigrants. As mentioned, this dynamic constitutes the political background for this 
thesis, but I focus on the link between referenda on independence and minority nationalist 
discourses on immigration as will be set forth in my second claim. Although, the nationalist 
discourse during the referendum is relevant, it is the perceived behaviour of immigrants during 
the referendum that locks in the discourse. The discourse is the background whereas the 
referendum is the vehicle behind attitude solidification based on immigrant 
participation/behaviour in the process. The medium in these cases produces the ‘message’viii, 
which leads me to my second assumption. 
2.  Immigration becomes a more salient issue under times of political stress, i.e. an independence 
referendum. 
 An independence referendum is significant to both nationalist symbolism and separation 
from the multinational state. Moments for self-determination are rare in modern multinational 
states so they represent an important phase for those seeking independence through solidarity. 
Because it is so important, the referendum can become the medium for the solidification of 
nationalist discourse toward immigrants as well. Further, immigrant behaviour in this particular 
moment is more salient as it is an opporuntity to show allegieance to the minority  nation.  The 
oppositional policies created by the nation- building process may generate diversity practices 
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wherein immigrants are percieved a certain way by the SSNRs. In one case, the minority region 
opposition results in more inclusive diversity policies and in the other, in more exclusive 
policies. In turn, in one case, immigrants might be more supportive of independentist movements 
and in the other, more supportive of the central government/preservation of the state.  This, then 
may create an environment wherein immigrants may counter such policies by supporting the 
cohesion of the multinational state rather than the emancipation of the sub-state nationalist 
region. Therefore, this claim lends itself to my final two hypotheses on the importance of 
immigrant framing during the  moment of self-determination. 
3.  Frames “operate by [re]activating information already at the recipient’s disposal” (Nelson, 
Oxley, and Clawson, 1997) which is to say, that the frame is not new, as it has already been 
constructed or perceived through another source but is reinforced through political articulation. 
For instance, how nationalist policies frame immigration are the underlying source for 
discursive framing in the independence referendum process. 
 In order for frames to be effective, the frame needs to be relevant to the experience of the 
participants (Snow, Tan, and Owens, 2013). The frame must also be significant to a larger belief 
system, while being salient to multiple values and prevailing cultural narratives and symbols. 
Without this salience, the frame may be discounted by the recipient audience (Snow and 
Benford, 1988). Indeed,  immigrant frames created prior to and during the independence 
referendum are relevent to the nationalist movements as immigrants are percieved either to aid or 
to undermine self-determination for the minority nation.  Nationalist movements akin to social 
movements, function to construct meaning for it participants and its opponents (Snow and 
Benford, 1988).   
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 Throughout the referendum period, many examples of ‘frame amplification’ (Snow et al., 
1986) may be observed. Frame amplification denotes the “clarification and invigoration of an 
interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events" (Snow et al., 
1986: 469).  Such an interpretive frame may stimulate the importance of existing beliefs or 
values.  The analysis that I undertook for each case study points to the use of frame amplification 
by political elites in order to highlight the involvement (or lack thereof) of immigrant 
communities in the sovereignty movement.  Such analysis has led me to view the referendum as 
lock-in mechanism for SSNP’s discourse and my final hypotheses.  
4. Minority nationalists’ perceptions of immigrant communities can be secured and normalized 
through increased framing process and political articulation especially when linked to political 
opportunity. 
 Importantly, I show how the discourse developed prior to the referendum by the minority 
nationalist movements and continued throughout the process is locked-in throughout the 
referendum period. The immigrant community position on the referendum (i.e. whether they are 
more or less disposed toward independence) will act as the mechanism that will lock in the 
minority nationalist discourses on immigrants. This mechanism is fed by the increased frame 
repetition (and amplificiaton) articulated by SSNPs political elites toward immigrant 
communities. The perceptions of immigrants become normalized in the referendum process.  
Further, a referendum, due to its symbolic salience as a 'test of loyalty', is a very special kind of 
an event that can be framed differently. The way in which immigrants are framed by movement 
actors can depend on the extent they constrain or facilitate the group’s collective action (i.e. the 
bid for independence). In other words, framing process and polticial opportunities can be 
interactively linked (Koopsman and Duyvendak, 1995). 
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 These four hypotheses allow me to highlight the causal chain that shows the link between 
the independence referendum process and sub-state nationalists attitudes towards immigrant 
communities. I construct my argument through an examination of the discourse and policy 
development of sub-state nationalist regions (SSNRs) toward immigrants during the referendum 
period. Through the use of process tracing, I argue that without a referendum the minority 
nationalist perceptions of immigrant communities would  be subject to greater flexibility of 
interpretation with a higher likelihood of variation in political attitudes. In other words, the 
independence referenda act as lock-in mechanisms that secure the immigrant identity frames 
presented by SSNP elites.    
3. 2 Methodological Considerations 
 
 I have chosen a small-n comparison for my analysis as it allows for theory building and 
tentative theory-testing by examining in more detail the political circumstances of Quebec, 
Catalonia, and Scotland. This comparison supports the conceptualization of a referendum as a 
lock-in mechanism through political narrative. I compare how despite differences in the 
institutional make up of each of these cases, the independence referendum process presents as a 
lock-in mechanism in each case.  This comparison allows me to illustrate that minority 
nationalist’s perceptions of immigrant groups can affect the immigrant groups’ involvement in 
the referendum, therefore, locking in discourse in multiple contexts. The project examines 
similar political movements in order to determine the impact of independence referendum in 
different cases.  
 The cases I have selected represent differing autonomous projects.  Quebec holds the 
most autonomous powers of the three sub-states being examined and is situated in a federal 
system in conjunction with the other provinces of Canada. Quebec has more control over the 
		 27	
immigration process than Catalonia or Scotland.  It also maintains the least immigrant friendly 
policies and attitudes. Quebec has held two referenda, one in 1980 and the second in 1995, both 
resulting in a ‘no’ vote winning the majority.  
 Catalonia has less autonomy than Quebec, but more than some other regions in Spain. As 
an ‘autonomous community’ it does hold some power over certain policies such as the 
socioeconomic integration of immigrants, yet little control over the immigration process itself.  
Unlike Canada, Spain is functionally, though not constitutionally, a ‘quasi-federal state’. This 
relationship gives Catalonia the capability to implement some policies, but little constitutional 
power with regard to immigration. The lack of constitutional sway also prevents Catalonia from 
officially seceding from the country, as they are not constitutionally permitted to hold an 
independence referendum, despite their efforts in the process in 2014ix and 2015.   
 Lastly, Scotland is a devolved region in the unitary state of the United Kingdom and 
maintains certain control over education and health, which can be useful in the integration 
process, but holds no power over immigration procedures.  Of the three cases at hand, the 
Scottish Government appears to foster the most positive opinion towards immigration, in which 
its main political parties seem united in the quest for independence. In 2014, Scotland held its 
first independence referenda with many immigrants voting ‘yes’ and with many also 
participating in the ‘yes’ campaigns. 
 The cases at hand were chosen for their variance, but also for their use of referenda in the 
nation-building process. The differences in political make –up between these regions strengthens 
the theoretical conception of a referendum as a lock-in mechanism as they highlight that this 
occurrence can happen in different countries.  The temporal variance between the individual 
referenda also contributes to the argument, as it is the referendum process analyzed as critical 
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instance in a nation’s political history that allows this project to understand how immigrant 
perceptions are formed and locked in.  
 My work seeks to evaluate the development of the political discourse toward immigrant 
populations during the independence referendum process. The goal is to investigate one 
particular similarity within different political systems. Comparing cases in multiple ‘sub-
systemic settings’ (Anckar, 2008) facilitates a focus on fewer variables and provides more detail 
on the cases being analyzed. In other words, by focusing on the referendum period in differing 
cultural contexts allows my research to analyze similar outcomes in each case.  
 I analyze government documents produced by the CiU, PQ (and Bloc Québécois), and 
SNP, in addition to political speeches by their parties’ main advocates in order examine how 
immigrants were framed in the independence process. I also evaluate various media, and other 
secondary sources including election polls. Through process tracing, I reconstruct the discourse 
and policy development that occurred before, during, and after the referendum in each case. 
Process tracing allows me to build the causal chain that has led to the model of the referendum as 
a lock in mechanism as it is exceptionally suited to identifying causal paths in circumstances of 
complex and interactive causality (Vlamskamp, 2009). The reconstruction of the developments 
in the discourse and policy patterns enables me to present a clear causal chain for analysis. 
Process tracing highlights the referendum to be a key determinant in the lasting rhetoric used by 
minority nations toward immigrant communities.  
 This analysis seeks to highlight referenda as a critical point in the nationalist objectives in 
each of these regions. In each of the case studies, I analyze the political articulation directed 
toward immigrants by the elites of the SSNPs. Examining political articulation enables me to 
highlight its causal impact on the perceptions of immigrant groups and, consequently on their 
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behaviour in the referendum process. This creates a feedback loop in each case between the 
minority regionalists’ views of immigrants and subsequent immigrant behaviour.  
 This chapter has highlighted the theoretical and methodological considerations of this 
project. The following chapters apply these considerations to each of the case studies at hand.  
Ultimately, I demonstrate, through various examples of discursive and anecdotal evidence as 
well as secondary sources analysis, how rhetoric used by SSNPs political elites in the 
independence referendum process affects nationalist immigrant perceptions thereafter.  
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Chapter 4: Quebec Case Study 
 
 Immigration is a central political issue in Canada, and by extension, in Quebec as well. 
The history of immigration in Quebec is complex as it was coupled with the rise of French 
Nationalism in the 1960s. During this time, French Canadians were primarily concerned for the 
survival of their unique identity in terms of language, society, and culture. Therefore, this case 
study begins by outlining the historical background on immigrant and language policy in 
Quebec, particularly from the impact of the Parti Québécois (PQ). This is followed by a 
discussion on the immigration policies and discourse that were developed in Quebec in 
opposition to Ottawa’s policy of multiculturalism. Furthermore, this analysis highlights an 
important dynamic between French and English speakers in the province and how this dynamic 
is further complicated by immigrant allophone speakersx.  
 The second section of the case study examines the independence referendum period and 
outlines the relationship between the PQ and immigrants during the process. This section also 
highlights the influence of the central government in Ottawa on voters within the region. 
Through an analysis of discourse and secondary sources, such as reports and polls, the 
referendum period is shown to lock-in political discourse towards immigrants. It appears that the 
needs of immigrants continue to be secondary to the demands of the French identity following 
the referendum. While immigrants were not a prominent political issue prior to the referendum 
they became politicized throughout the referendum (a time of political stress in Quebec), but 
were not framed as part of the nationalist fabric. This lack of inclusion in such a political process 
consequently impacted the support for sovereignty amongst immigrant voters.  It is important to 
note that of the cases examined here, Quebec appears the least welcoming with regards to 
attitudes and policies directed towards immigrants, resulting in immigrant groups supporting a 
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unitary Canada.  Lastly, the third section of the case study examines the post –referendum period 
in Quebec in order to determine what happened as a result of the referendum.  
4. 1 Immigration, Language and Interculturalism in Quebec 
 
            Until the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s, the general policies of the Quebec government 
deterred immigration in order to maintain the unique character of French Quebec (Hepburn, 
2011). Yet, throughout the same period, the immigration of various other cultural groups 
(especially, Vietnamese, Haitians, Latin Americans and Lebanese) was needed to boost a 
declining population in the province. Quebec depended on immigrant arrivals throughout the 
1970s and 1980s (and beyond) in order to mitigate population decline from low fertility rates and 
outward migration. A Quebec-specific immigration policy would therefore allow the province to 
recruit more French-speakers, potentially alleviating some of the population challenges while 
maintaining a certain level of national identity. In order to accomplish such a policy, the Quebec 
government requested more autonomy in the selection of immigrants (Hepburn, 2011).  
            Elected for the first time in 1976, the PQ continued the immigration negotiations that the 
Quebec Liberals had previously started with the federal government in order to attract and retain 
French-speaking immigrants while seeking greater immigration control for the region (Hepburn, 
2011). The legislation they put forward in 1979 provided the foundation for the 1991 Accord that 
the Quebec Liberal Government signed with the Canadian Federal Government. The PQ had 
advocated since 1979 for greater autonomy for the province, in regards to immigration control 
and the selection of immigrants from French-speaking countries. This policy objective was 
achieved in 1991 with the Canada-Quebec Accord, which formally broadened the abilities of the 
Quebec government by granting Quebec control over sixty percent of its immigration population 
and provided them control of the selection and integration of immigrants (Kelley &Trebilcock, 
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1998: 392). The adoption of the Canada- Quebec Accord has consequently resulted in Quebec 
having its own points-based system for immigration that does not require major input from the 
federal government.  Accordingly, Quebec actually uses greater points of discretion than the 
federal government when choosing immigrants for their region. For instance, candidates are 
graded under a 22 point scale for “personal suitability” (Canada, 1991). , compared to the 10-
point scale under the federal immigration program. Candidates for the Quebec region were also 
graded under “personal quality, motivation and knowledge of Quebec” (Canada, 1991). . Each 
applicant was given 12 points for knowledge of the French language, while English language 
skills only grants them two points (Canada, 1991). Immigration policies in Quebec were 
specifically designed to attract and retain immigrants that would appropriately contribute the 
Quebec nation without harming its cultural integrity. 
            When the PQ government returned to power in 1994, they designed immigration and 
educational policies that would facilitate access to French-language courses and promote the 
integration of immigrants in Quebec society. Despite Canada being a country built on 
immigration, most of the past provincial departments of education have had historically 
assimilating educational policies (Ghosh, 2001). Therefore, while those in the rest of English-
speaking Canada have received education from the angle of an Anglo-dominated culture, those 
in Quebec have been assimilated in the same vein, but through the French language and with a 
concentration on Quebec culture (Ghosh, 2001). Such a society implies there is no acceptance, or 
rather a lack of recognition of cultural differences, except between the ‘dominant’ English and 
the ‘subordinate’ French for ethnic groups in all of Canada and Quebec. Historically, in all 
regions of the country, racial and ethnic differences were ignored in an effort to diminish the 
characteristics of non-dominant groups (Ghosh and Abdi, 2004). The exclusion of the ‘other’ in 
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Canada, as can be seen in Quebec, was structural, and perpetuated through negation 
and language (Ghosh and Abdi, 2004). The historical impact of this exclusion is important to 
understanding the divide between French and English groups. This divide has allowed politicians 
to ignore other ethnic pressures within Quebec.  
 The creation of a dichotomy between those who speak French, and those who do not, 
may extend beyond English speakers during a time of political turbulence such as the referendum 
The creation of the ‘other’ in Quebec is the result of structural changes to Quebec legislature that 
were implemented in order to safeguard the French language from increasing immigrant patterns 
(Ghosh, 2004).  Those who do not incorporate themselves into the French-speaking group may 
not be seen as part of the Québécois national community, and then may be framed as outsiders.   
  The link between immigration and language use in Quebec is a particularly important 
one. In 1974, French became the sole official language of Quebec. In 1977, Bill 101 was 
introduced, which made it law that all children, save those with English parents, be educated in 
French.  Immediate controversy followed this Bill as it gave primacy to the rights of 
Francophones as a collective over the individual rights of non-Francophones. However, the 
preference of most Quebec immigrants has been to send their children to English schools “for 
economic and social prestige reasons” (Ghosh, 2004: 558). The ability to speak English would 
also provide them with a greater connection to the rest of Canada, meaning with changes such as 
Bill 101 many immigrants during this time were less sympathetic to the PQ and the sovereignty 
agenda (Ghosh, 2001). 
            Bill 101 was the first significant change brought forth by the PQ government and 
highlights an important aspect of sub-state national party politics as it demonstrates that 
‘integrating’ immigrants to suit the nationalist project begins with education. Notably, this Bill 
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also came shortly after the Federal Official Languages Act, which made both French and English 
the official languages of Canada, and was presented during a time when the Federal Government 
under Pierre Trudeau was encouraging a pan-Canadian identity that embraced bilingualism.  In 
its response, the PQ instead attempted to embrace the French Québec identity for the 
province.  This was, however, met with discontent amongst immigrants wishing to learn English 
(Ghosh, 2004). 
            In 1978, extending on the French educational initiatives in schools, the PQ government 
developed the Policy on Cultural Development, which stipulated the importance of diversity in 
the establishment of a common society through the French Language. This policy was ultimately 
developed into the intercultural initiatives that were established in response to the 
multiculturalism policies set forth by the Federal Canadian Government.  With regards to 
education, “Intercultural Education” was to be the method for integrating newcomers to the 
province (Ghosh, 2004). Education policies in Quebec, theoretically, created ‘‘new efforts to 
integrate immigrant students and prepare the whole student population to participate in social 
integration in democratic, Francophonic, pluralistic Quebec’’ (Quebec, 1998: v). SSNPs, in 
general, and the PQ in particular, noted that (French) Education would play a key role in 
ensuring the social order of the nation. 
 For Quebec, interculturalism means a society that is pluralistic in outlook, but 
Francophone through its reliance on the use of the French language. It is the immigrantsꞌ 
responsibility to acquaint themselves with the ‘‘cultural codes of the new society and redefine 
one’s identity to reconcile these values with those of one’s original culture’’ (Quebec, 1990: 45). 
As Québécois national project aims to protect the erosion of Francophone identity from the 
English Canadian majority, the needs of other cultural communities become secondary in that 
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they are met through the context of "Quebec nationalism and not based on their own merit" 
(Ghosh, 2004: 561). This means that despite their unique views and cultural practices, immigrant 
demands (educational, economic, etc.) are met through a French lens in order to benefit the 
nationalist movement. While language learning is essential, it is not an adequate requirement to 
enhance the overall intercultural education in Quebec. Meeting the rudimentary equality needs of 
cultural communities continues to occupy little space for concern in Quebec education and 
society (Ghosh, 1995), in which Quebec’s concentration on the French versus English dichotomy 
pushed immigrant Allophones in the region to the background. 
 Despite this apparent disparagement, the educational initiatives set forth by the PQ have 
in some way aided their pro-independence agenda. For many immigrants whose children (or they 
themselves) have been educated under Bill 101, a level of sympathy towards the sovereignty 
movement is more readily identified (Duerr, 2011). These individuals are more recent arrivals 
from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, and have not been exposed to the previous ethnic-based 
nationalist policies (Duerr, 2011). Long-term immigrant groups such as Greek, Italian, and 
Jewish immigrants, however, are less sympathetic towards the PQ as the sovereignty movement 
to them is defined more on ethnic lines.   
 Contemporary Canada and Quebec are both very ethnically, racially, and culturally 
diverse, yet use different tools when approaching immigration and diversity. Canada upholds a 
policy of multiculturalism in which individuals are encouraged to retain and share their cultural 
heritage. Quebec (especially under the PQ) has adamantly rejected this ‘Canadian’ model of 
diversity and uses its own policy of interculturalism. Notably, this method is seen as weakening 
the bi-national conception of Canada (McRoberts, 1997). Historically, Quebec perceives 
multiculturalism as a rejection of the English –French Canadian identity and one that undermines 
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the distinct society of French Quebec through embracing all cultural communities that exist 
within Canada. With the resurgence of Quebec nationalism in the 1960s, the Royal Commission 
on Biculturalism and Bilingualism investigated the relationship between Francophones and 
Anglophones and the binary nature of Canadian society, and concluded instead that there were 
more than two cultures in Canada. The concept of Canadian multiculturalism emerged after the 
Commission (Hanson, 1992; Gagnon, 2000; Tremblay, 2010-1; McRoberts, 2001) and Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau formalized a Canadian multiculturalism policy in 1971. 
 Some scholars argue that Trudeau may have developed multiculturalism as a tool to 
integrate Quebec Francophones into the rest of Canada (McRoberts, 2001; Classon and Howes, 
2012). This perception has certainly been viewed through the political discourse in Quebec as all 
elected governments of Quebec have firmly rejected federal multiculturalism (Bouchard, 2010-
11, p. 462).  The perception that multiculturalism was intended to weaken Quebec and its 
nationalist aspirations is quite common in Quebec politics and has infiltrated the way in which 
cultural communities are discussed. Ultimately, Quebec views multiculturalism as way to 
demean Quebec culture as a part of the ‘Canadian cultural mosaic’ instead of as a distinct society 
and a nation, which delegitimizes Quebec’s nation-building policies (Tremblay, 2010; Bouchard, 
2010; McRoberts, 2001; Blad and Couton, 2009). Consequently, multiculturalism disagrees that 
Quebec should be able to institute itself as the main rallying point of identity for its inhabitants 
(Gagnon, 2000,). 
 The PQ has fostered policies of interculturalism in response to Canada’s multiculturalism 
strategy. Quebec has actively rejected both the federal policies of bilingualism and of 
multiculturalism and developed a unique intercultural political approach to diversity that is 
explicitly in opposition to Federal Canadian multiculturalism (Gagnon and Iacovino, 2007: 96). 
		 37	
Throughout the 1970s Canada saw an influx of immigrants from various countries. Under the 
Trudeau government, the 1976 Immigration Act saw individuals arriving from ‘non-traditional’ 
countries, coupled with an increase in “visible minorities”.xi At the same time, Quebec began 
pursuing its own methods of immigration and integration. The 1970s were a time of rebellion for 
the PQ against federal government policies and initiatives, which culminated in Quebec’s first 
unsuccessful independence referendum in 1980. 
 The PQ views diversity as an opportunity to build on the notion of Quebec as a shared 
nation for all of its residents. One distinction between multiculturalism and interculturalism is 
that in Canada identity can be hyphenated. For example, someone originating from Iraq would be 
Iraqi-Canadian. Whereas in Quebec, everyone becomes ‘Québécois’. While interculturalism 
appears akin to assimilation, as no one maintains the identity of their country of origin, it 
distinguishes itself by expecting all newcomers to affect the culture of the province given their 
background.  Immigrants can help shape Quebec culture, but they cannot maintain long-term 
connections to their ancestral roots (Duerr, 2011). Immigrants to Quebec are expected to learn 
the (French) language, while acquiring a Quebec identity. Many members of the PQ argue that it 
is up to the individual to choose the language spoken at home and one’s religion (Duerr 2011).  
            The influx of immigrants to Canada and the rise of the sovereignty movement in Quebec 
ran historically parallel to one other.  While the PQ has attempted to include new arrivals into the 
province it has a hard time convincing all immigrants towards the sovereignty movement. 
Québécois nationalism is derived from “a homogenous tradition, whereby the population was 
historically French speaking, ethnically homogenous, and Catholic” (Duerr, 2011: 4). Therefore, 
some believe that Quebec independence has only significance to those with French ancestry.  In 
this vein, interculturalism should provide “the key element... to a common purpose in public 
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matters” and a more cohesive path for self-determination in Quebec (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007: 
96). Interculturalism, as shown through Quebec’s integration strategies, is supposed to create 
unity amongst all residents in Quebec by offering “a centre which also serves as a marker of 
identity in the larger society and denotes in itself a pole of allegiance for all citizens” (Gagnon 
and Iacovino 2007: 96).  
 Immigrants, however, threaten this cohesion by choosing the English-speaking culture 
over its French counterpart. Therefore, immigrants threaten the French collectivity indirectly by 
increasing Anglophone numbers and reinforcing their institutions (Breton, 1988). In this vein, 
Quebec’s political discourse may often be voiced as suspicious of immigrant populations.  
Correspondingly, much discursive evidence highlights the xenophobic comments that have come 
from various people in leadership positions and at different levels in the movement (Duerr 2011, 
Saywell 1977).  For instance, the PQ founder Rene Lévesque once wrote on “the mission of our 
race” (Saywell 1977, 2), which emphasized ethnicity and marginalized others that fell outside 
this traditional identity.  
           Upon re-election in 1994, some efforts were made by the PQ to garner immigrant support 
through civic nationalist lines in preparation for the second referendum in 1995.Some attempts 
were made to facilitate immigrant’s access to French courses in an effort to better integrate them 
into Quebec Society (Hepburn, 2011). PQ policies, however, offered many contradictions in 
regards to attitudes towards immigrant groups. While the PQ’s official line had become that a 
Québécois was whoever chose to live in Quebec, they had also implemented a new computerized 
Quebec electoral list that required proof of Canadian citizenship (Smith, 2013). The new system 
would cross check each voter through a service provided by the Quebec Health Insurance Board. 
This system was anticipated to disprove the eligibility of thousands of immigrants who had voted 
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illegally in the past. Logically, I assume that in such a close campaign that could be decided by 
fewer than 100,000 votes, invalidating non-eligible immigrants, traditionally pro-federalist, 
could prove beneficial to the sovereignty movement.  
 Discursive evidence also shows similar contradictions in the PQs attitudes towards 
immigrants. Bernard Landry (when PQ vice-president) was often quoted saying that “pure 
laine belongs to the textile industry and not to Quebec sociology” (Thanh Ha, 2015).  This 
statement insinuated that the out-of-fashion term pure laine — used for the traditional Québécois 
identity of a ‘homogenous French and catholic culture’— was no longer what the PQ party 
represented. In these statements, Landry had become the PQ’s ‘ambassador’ to the ethnic 
communities. Yet, only a year before the referendum, Landry stated that it was not “healthy that 
democracy in Montreal is at the complete mercy of the vote of ethnic communities” (Turner 
1995). Philippe Pare, Parizeau’s consultant, also thought, “that non-French speakers should 
abstain from the vote and let Francophones settle the issue themselves” (Turner 1995).  
             At a January 1993 nomination meeting in the Charlevoix riding, Parizeau claimed that 
the Charlottetown accord had been vetoed in Quebec mainly thanks to francophone voters. 
Parizeau had stated that that it “proves [that] when we Québécois, Francophones de souche,xii 
want something democratically, we are able to get it” (Thanh Ha, 2015). Later Mr. Parizeau tried 
to amend himself by stating that “a Québécois is whoever wants to be a Québécois” (Thanh Ha, 
2015) but the damage had already been done. Ultimately, these examples serve to set the 
political foreground as Quebec enters the referendum period in 1995. As will be highlighted in 
the following sections, while Québécois nationalism prior to the 1995 referendum moved in the 
direction of civic variety, it nevertheless retained ethnic elements. Because of this, it was a 
nationalism that was perceived as ethnically exclusive by many immigrant voters. Such a 
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perception may have consequences for the support of sovereignty amongst the immigrant 
demographic. This perception is now explored throughout the period of the referendum 
campaign and following the vote.  
4. 2 The 1995 Independence Referendum  	
 In 1995, Quebec, under the PQ government, held its second independence referendum.  
This thesis examines the referendum period from September 1995, when the National Assembly 
was presented with a Bill outlining the conditions for a sovereign Quebecxiii. The independence 
referendum process was to run similar to a provincial election campaign with the "Yes" camp led 
by ‘Le Comité national du OUI’, and the "No" camp led by ‘Le Comité des Québécoises et des 
Québécois pour le NON’. The Parti Québec leader, Jacques Parizeau, headed the Yes Campaign, 
while the No campaign was led by Québec Liberal leader, Daniel Johnson, and backed by the 
Federal Government under the Jean Chrétien Liberal Administration. The referendum question 
asked: “Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to 
Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the 
future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?” 
  Up until a few weeks before the vote, the NO side had been garnering the most support. 
This prompted Parizeau to give way to the charismatic Lucien Bouchard as chief negotiator. 
Bouchard appealed to the Québécois desire for change and to finding a solution to the 
longstanding issues with Canada through a new partnership rather than separation. Bouchard was 
so appealing to the public that his comments towards Québécois as a "white race" with the 
lowest birthrate, stating; “we’re one of the white races that has the fewest children”, went 
without much controversy (Cardinal 2005). The discursive repercussions of such a statement, 
however, are important to note. When political leaders use such terminology, they insinuate that 
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the national project is focused on ethnic components, not to mention such statements are 
marginalizing to non-white cultural communities. Moreover, the absence of political backlash for 
such a statement underlies an important theme in Quebec politics, that oftentimes immigrant 
groups have simply been ignored. 
            Notably, Suzanne Tremblay, a MP with the Bloc Québécoisxiv, did receive more criticism 
than Bouchard for her comments regarding the name of Montreal based Journalist Joyce Napier 
(whose parents are of Egyptian origin) (Vancouver Sun, 1995). When Napier questioned 
Tremblay on how minority Francophones outside of Quebec would be supported in the case of a 
successful independence referendum, Tremblay responded by saying that Napier's family name 
and lack of a Québécois accent made her question irrelevant (Edmonton Journal, 1995). This was 
a clear ethnic insinuation based on Napier’s family’s heritage, highlighting the underlining ethnic 
national themes as presented by members of the PQ and BQ.  
 Another example that demonstrates the sparking divide between French Québécois and 
the immigrants also comes from Tremblay. During the referendum campaign, Suzanne Tremblay 
criticized Liberal Leader Daniel Johnson for his statement that all Canadians (except aboriginals, 
but including Québécois) are immigrants to Canada. Tremblay stated that "we came first, the 
others arrived later" and  "treating us all as immigrants is reducing us all to the rank of ethnic 
groups"(Ditchburn, 1995). Tremblay’s attitudes marginalized newcomers and aided in the chasm 
between immigrant groups and sovereigntists. As voiced by Aminata Diabate, a Guinean who 
came to Quebec a generation ago, “comments like [Tremblay’s] are alienating [to] potential 
sovereignty supporters” (Ditchburn, 1995). While Diabate is a native French speaker, she freely 
admits that she does not find solidarity in the sovereignty movement, as she has nothing in 
common with sovereigntists (Ditchburn, 1995). 
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            Such examples emphasize the antagonistic relations that developed between sub- state 
nationalist regional (SSNR) party members and immigrants throughout the referendum period. 
Other scholars, such as Breton (1988), O’Shea (2000) and Hepburn (2011), however, argue that 
while some attempts were made by the party to secure their votes, immigrant voters did not 
usually support the PQ. Many immigrant voters do not believe the PQ to be a representative of 
their interests (Hepburn, 2011). It is conceivable that many immigrants have strong feelings for 
Canada because they chose to come to Canada for a better life (Handler, 1988). Canada as a 
country has provided this life for many immigrants and their families. Therefore, many 
immigrants may not hold their allegiance to Quebec but to Canada as a whole. Numerous 
immigrants are opposed to Quebec sovereignty because they have already devoted significant 
means into becoming Canadian citizens (Handler, 1988: 178). Discursive examples also show 
this impression exists among separatist parties in Quebec. During Question Period in October of 
1995, a Bloc Québécois MP questioned the rapid rate in which newcomers to Quebec were being 
granted Canadian citizenship during the month of October prior to the referendum. It was 
suggested that citizenship applications were being hurried for immigrants who would most likely 
vote ‘No’ (Canada, 1995). 
 A discursive analysis of immigrant opinions highlights their perception of the PQ and the 
BQ. This examination offers important insinuations for their voting patterns and support 
throughout the sovereignty movement. For some immigrants the sovereignty movement appealed 
to them as they could relate to it based on their own struggles with national aspirations in their 
home countries. For example, Kurdish immigrant Arthur Kaplan stated that “Kurds [understood 
the movement] because [they] have been struggling for the same thing" (Ditchburn, 1995).  
Kaplan had actually been a member of the BQ ethnic commission, but left soon after (along with 
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four others) as he felt that the immigrant members were “there to represent ethno-cultural 
communities in the sovereigntist movement but [the BQ] just wanted us to be puppets" 
(Ditchburn, 1995). While such examples hint that the efforts of the sovereignty moment to 
appease immigrant voters may have been simply political window-dressing, they more 
importantly demonstrate the existence of similar perceptions within the immigrant community.  
 Admittedly, not all immigrant groups were against the sovereignty movement. There 
existed a few groups, such as the coalition of Latin American Quebecers, who represented 
approximately 20 to 35 per cent of the 5,000-strong community that supported the movement. 
Some Arab Quebecers were also not content with Federal Liberal attitudes towards immigrants 
and ethnic communities, as voiced by the president of the National Council on Canada-Arab 
Relations who stated: “Our community has felt a blatant elitist arrogance on the part of the 
federal government” (Ditchburn, 1995). Nevertheless, some Italian, Greek and Jewish groups 
were very politically active for the No campaign and had impressive success in their endeavours. 
Spokespeople from the Jewish, Greek and Italian National Congresses worked together in order 
to have greater impact on the separatist debate. While the individuals who are considered part of 
the immigrant groups may have their own unique origins and demands, they may also share 
similar interests. So while there was some discontent toward the Canadian Federal Government, 
as was exhibited by the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations, the majority of support 
from immigrants was directed towards to the No campaign.  
 The preceding examples highlight the contradictory political actions that are found 
throughout the referendum period and how the period itself heightened the disconnection 
between the main separatist groups and immigrant voters. Throughout, and prior to the 
referendum period, members of the PQ and the Bloc Québécois had either ignored or alienated 
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immigrant groups. While many political speeches and statements do not specifically outline 
discontent towards immigrants, the racial insinuations are evident (Duerr, 2011). Significantly, 
the referendum period appeared to highlight a widening chasm between immigrants and 
Francophones in terms of who should be deciding Quebec’s fate.  
 Discursive evidence leading up to the referendum vote highlights the existence of this 
growing divide and strengthens the concept of Francophones as insiders and immigrants as 
outsiders. A week before the final vote was held public opinion polls suggested that the majority 
of Francophone Québécois would vote for independence. However, the 1.1 million Anglophone 
and allophone votes could have provided federalists a narrow victory.  In this vein a “linguistic 
canyon between voters” may have provoked fears of backlash from those working on both the 
Yes and the No campaigns (The Daily News, 1995).   
 Some critics questioned why Francophone Québécois should not get to decide the fate of 
Quebec for themselves, stating that it was “too bad that mass immigration and the English could 
overturn a unanimous decision of Francophone Quebecers" (The Daily News, 1995).  Quebec 
Premier Jacques Parizeau was further criticized for expressing a similar viewpoint in a statement 
that preceded his election in 1994, in which he argued that “old-stock Quebecers” could win a 
referendum (The Daily News, October 22, 1995). During Parizeau’s campaign he also had to let 
go of his consultant, Pierre Bourgault, after Bourgault forewarned of the difficulties that would 
evolve if Anglophones and ethnic voters held back the will of the francophone majority (The 
Daily News, October 22, 1995).  
 During the referendum period, many former politicians cautioned towards the developing 
linguistic and ethnic divide that was occurring. Former Liberal Premier of Quebec, Robert 
Bourassa, warned that ‘social peace’ could be threatened by this kind of linguistic divide. It was 
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becoming evident a No vote may lead to a volatile post-referendum dynamic between 
Francophones and the ‘other’, which risked moving from the “fringes to the frontlines” (The 
Daily News October 22, 1995).  For this reason, Bourassa advised against targeting any single 
demographic group after the referendum results were counted as it would be “risky to identify 
certain groups and say it's because of old people or non-Francophones or women” (The Daily 
News October 22, 1995).   Other politicians, such as Lucien Bouchard, also cautioned against the 
development of this divide earlier in 1994. Former Mulroney Cabinet Minister, Marcel Masses 
also suggested the post-referendum would be challenging after a No vote as "it will be a big 
clash six or seven months after (a No vote) when they will realize for the first time since 1759 
the majority of Francophones have no control of their land.... that will be a big shock" (The Daily 
News October 22, 1995). 
  The role of immigrant groups is a very delicate and ambiguous subject in Quebec, yet 
remains a consistent feature in the region’s politics. With such a public role within politics, a loss 
for the separatists could provoke tensions between the two groups. Scholars at the time predicted 
this same dynamic as they argued that Francophones might feel Anglophones and immigrants 
should not have a role in their destiny (Simard, 1995). As an attachment to Quebec, as the 
national region is not perceived in immigrant groups, the francophone groups may feel betrayed 
by ‘outsiders’, while it was not  “politically correct to say it too openly " (Simard,1995). 
Ultimately, the perception of the immigrant groups as the ‘other’ plays a large role in how they 
may or may not support for the sovereigntist movement in Quebec. 
 Important to address is the fact that much of the preceding analysis comes from English 
sources. The occurrence of this is somewhat intentional as the English media sources are more 
pertinent to this discussion for two reasons. Firstly, immigrants tend to learn English and would 
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assumedly pay more attention to English news sources. Secondly, these media outlets 
perpetuated the rhetoric used by the separatist politicians and consequently contributed to the 
way immigrants were framed throughout the referendum. While French media sources show 
some integrationists attitudes; they mostly come from Bernard Landry. As previously mentioned, 
Landry was dedicated to merging concepts of Francophone Quebec with that of non-
Francophones.  Despite his efforts for the party, however, the nationalism of the PQ was slow to 
fully integrate non-Francophones to his conception of the Quebec nation (Legault, 1995). Aside 
from the commitments published in various texts and party programs, it is clear that PQ still 
tends to appoint non-Francophones as an ‘other’ within their nationalist perceptions.  The 
‘other’, ‘the immigrant’, the ‘allophone’, and the ‘ethnique’, are rarely presented as an organic 
part of Quebec's collective identity (Legault, 1995). Such labeling makes it challenging for 
newcomers to become a part of the Quebec nation in any true fashion. 
 French sources also highlight the inconsistencies in the PQs ability to treat immigrants as 
part of Québécois national fabric. In attempting to integrate the immigrant they more often than 
not alienate them, which is a unique phenomenon in Quebec of the case studies analysed here. 
While Scottish and Catalan parties do create some social cohesion between immigrants and 
SSNPs, the same attachment to the nation is not found amongst the majority of the immigrant 
population in Quebec.  
 As was originally predicted, without this social cohesion many immigrants voted against 
the referendum in 1995. In the weeks leading up to the election polls forecasted a strong 
francophone majority for YES, and a non-Francophone vote for the NO (around 95%). The 
statistical analysis of voting cards indeed confirms the same voting patterns (Drouilly, 1995). 
While the exact results cannot be determined, based on country of origin, they can be determined 
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on linguistic lines. Based on an analysis of the referendum vote results, the polarization of the 
vote on a linguistic basis is strongest. As revealed in Pierre Drouilly’s (1995) analysis of the 
Quebec referendum results, language is a strong determining factor to explain voting behaviour. 
While the referendum was very close (50.6% NO to 49.4% YES), with 80 constituencies voting 
yeses and only 45 voting no, the imbalance present reflects the imbalance in the geographical 
distribution of voters according their mother tongue (Drouilly, 1995).  
 While almost all regions of Quebec voted yes, the pattern of votes in Montreal mirrors 
the region’s linguistic boundaries. The results obtained by the yes in the 125 constituencies are 
actually strongly linked to the percentage of Francophones in each of them (correlation 0.861). 
This relationship is obviously higher in the Montreal area, however, (correlation 0.959) than in 
the rest of Quebec (correlation 0.598). Conversely, the results of the no vote are strongly linked 
to the percentage of English voters (0.801 correlation) or allophones (0.626 correlation) 
(Drouilly, 1995).  
 The results highlight that perceptions leading up to the vote are confirmed by the analysis 
offered in Drouilly’s study. These perceptions have created immigrant identity frames presented 
by SSNP elites, thereby affecting voter choice by immigrant groups. The immigrant vote against 
independence, or more importantly the perception of this,  feed back into Québécois hostility to 
immigrants as a possible threat to the national project. The independence referendum process in 
Quebec has acted as a lock-in mechanism that secures negative discourse towards immigrants 
that extend beyond the referendum period.  
 Ultimately, the infamous statement by Jacques Parizeau that the defeat of the yes vote in 
the 1995 sovereignty referendum should be blamed on “money and ethnic vote” has a twofold 
importance. Firstly, Parizeau played on perceptions built up throughout the referendum period. 
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Many immigrants did not vote for independence as the PQ and the Bloc have had difficulties in 
incorporating immigrants into the sovereignty movement.  The alienation towards immigrants 
indeed continued and intensified during the referendum process.  Secondly, Parizeau’s statement 
acts as an important discursive point for the argument of this thesis. As from this point, the 
relationship between immigrant groups and the PQ does not improve.  The post referendum 
period will now be examined in the following section to understand how the referendum locked-
in political discourse of the PQ towards immigrants.    
 4. 3 After the 1995 referendum 	
 The independence referendum process in Quebec exposed and intensified ethnic and 
national divides in the region (Cairns, 1996; McRoberts, 1997).  Moreover, it worked against the 
sovereignty movement by increasing particularistic identities amongst immigrant (and English 
and aboriginal) populations to the detriment of the Francophone identity (Cairns, 1996).  As 
demonstrated here and voiced elsewhere (Cairns, 1996; McRoberts 1997; Breton, 1988) the 
allure of the YES vote was to the Francophone majority, as the movement was intended to boost 
the French culture and language of the Québécois and not to improve the positions of minority 
groups; this intention was generally understood by immigrant groups (Cairns, 1996). As such, 
discursive examples, such as Parizeau’s ‘money and ethnic vote’ statement underlined the 
tensions existing within the region following the vote. The period of time from 1995-2001 
exhibits further examples of national divides in the region and the unease created between 
immigrants and separatists, which was exemplified in policy and discursive developments. As 
will be demonstrated in the succeeding paragraphs, a feedback loop between anti-immigrant 
sentiments and immigrant unease leading into distrust of the sovereignty movement is developed 
in the region as consequence of the referendum period.  To understand this feedback loop, I 
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begin by highlighting some discursive evidence from those involved in the sovereignty 
movement, which is followed by an examination of immigrant perceptions.  
 While Parizeau’s declaration was widely denounced, some separatists and scholars admit 
that it accentuates the thread of ethnocentrism and intolerance that can be found in the fabric of 
Francophone nationalism in Quebec (Turner, 1995; Cairns 1996; and McRoberts, 1997).   
Notably, Parizeau's remarks were not the only ones to cause controversy, as there were news 
reports of others in the separatist movement criticizing immigrants for their involvement in the 
loss (Thanh Ha, 1995; Mussally, 1996.)  After the referendum, several news outlets reported that 
Deputy Premier Bernard Landry caused a disturbance at a hotel by ranting about the results of 
the vote to two immigrant employees, insinuating their involvement in the defeat of the 
independence referendum (Turner, 1995). An apology was made after the hotel incident, but 
Landry surrendered his cabinet post as immigration minister on November 10, soon following 
the incident.  Separatist advocate, Pierre Bourgault, also exclaimed that it was the Jews, Italians, 
and Greeks of Montreal who are “racist” for voting as a bloc against sovereignty.  Bourgault 
labeled these groups as “racist” due to their leaderships in the no campaign for the immigrant 
population (Turner, 1995).  Such examples highlight the ‘us versus them’ rhetoric that is framed 
in the PQ and sovereigntist discourse.  
 Correspondingly, the way immigrants’ feel they are framed by SSNPs could impact how 
they feel about the sovereignty movement, which is what appears to have occurred in the 
referendum process. As such, the referendum results contributed to a new sentiment among 
allophone groups that opposed sovereignty and also Quebec nationalism itself (McRoberts, 
1997). Some immigrant groups also feared public backlash following the results and statements 
made by certain political officials. Discursive evidence indicated that immigrants who have lived 
		 50	
in Quebec for decades now felt an unwelcome animosity, as if “in back of everyone's mind 
[they’re] not wanted here" (Mason, 1995). Such sentiments were particularly found in Montreal 
where thousands of immigrants from countries such as Greece, Haiti, Mexico, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, and China voted against independence. 
 Additionally, those that were heavily involved in the campaign against the separatist 
option were left feeling threatened by repeated affronts against the ethnic minorities in Quebec 
(JTA, 1995). Bourgault’s accusation in November 1995, that the province’s Jewish, Greek and 
Italian communities are racist, but the Québécois are not, generated anxiety within the Jewish 
community (JTA, 1995).  The Canadian Jewish Congress responded to Bourgault on behalf of 
the Quebec Jewish Community by stating that: “Pierre Bourgault’s remarks on ethnic 
communities are reprehensible, intolerant and reflect a profound disregard for democratic values 
as well as the fundamental right of all Quebecers to freely express their political opinion,” (Max 
Bernard; JTA, 1995).  The Hellenic Congress of Quebec and the National Congress of Italian 
Canadians issued similar statements criticizing Bourgault and calling for social harmony in 
Quebec. Furthermore, anxiety surrounded the formation of a new right-wing nationalists group, 
the Quebec National Liberation Movement (MNLQ) that was created to specifically address the 
separatist cause.  
 Raymond Villeneuve, a separatist extremist involved in the Quebec Liberation Front 
(FLQ) in the 1960s, spearheaded the Quebec National Liberation Movement (MNLQ). 
Villeneuve stated that the new group would “seek to ostracize the foes of separatism” (JTA, 
1995). Other goals for the group included “seeking a moratorium of immigration to Quebec, 
launching an ‘unrelenting struggle’ against Canadian domination and against the ‘internal 
enemies’ of Quebec, and the creation of an all-French school system”(JTA, 1995).  In September 
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1996, Villeneuve made a statement that specifically targeted English speaking Jews for their 
venerable opposition to Bill 101 and the Quebec separatist movement, and offered a general 
warning that these communities will need to prepare for a free Quebec (Canadian Jewish News, 
1996).  Such statements focused attention on mainstream separatist parties, with the Federal 
Liberal Party attempting to link the Bloc to such statements, while the PQ attempted to distance 
itself.  The official position of mainstream separatist parties is that every Quebecker is equal and 
that citizenship is defined by residence, not heritage.   Many of the main advocates in the 
sovereignty movement, however, have been caught vocalizing the opposite.   
 The evidence in Quebec appears to indicate the development of a discursive feedback 
loop in the post-referendum period. Indeed, the referendum in Quebec locked-in a discursive 
feedback loop between immigrant unease and the development of anti-immigrant rhetoric as seen 
in figure 2.  
Figure 2:Discursive feedback loop in Quebec 
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As this cycle became locked-in, following the disappointing loss in the referendum and 
controversial statement, Parizeau resigned his position as Premier and Parti Québec Leader. The 
party’s successor, Lucien Bouchard, worked quickly to draw attention away from the sovereignty 
question and move towards other issues in Quebec, such as the province’s public finances 
(McRoberts, 1997). Yet, as was discussed previously, the political tensions that had been opened 
during the referendum did not dissolve quickly. The following section of this chapter outlines 
that provincial policies also developed in a similar contentious manner.  
 In the December following the referendum, the PQ's National Council met to review 
various resolutions and proposals between conventions, and discuss the future of party leadership 
following Parizeau. Some members of the PQ were hoping to promote a harder line on the 
promotion of French Language and immigrant integration. In addition to choosing their new 
premier (which was thought to become and would become Lucien Bouchard), many proposals 
were submitted that outlined stricter language requirements.  One proposal suggested the 
resurrection of the restrictive language requirements of Bill 101that were passed by the first PQ 
government in 1977. Another proposal outlined “the imposition of unilingual French signs both 
inside and outside any private or public establishment in order that Québec have an essentially 
French face'' (Herbert and La Pierre, 1995). Prior to this there had been various exceptions that 
allowed bilingual signs.  
 Another resolution highlighted the sovereigntists' failure to win any significant support 
from Quebec immigrant communities in the October 30 referendum. Thus, the resolution called 
for an analysis of the ethnic vote and an effort to develop a new approach including ``political 
education and discussion(s) on sovereignty'' (Herbert and La Pierre, 1995). These resolutions, 
however, came at a time when Bouchard had hoped to appease apprehensions in the province's 
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English-speaking and ethnic communities.  In this vein, the party had little success in rebuilding 
its relationship with immigrants politically. In the1998 election, the PQ in the Quebec National 
Assembly elected only one ethnic minority; all other minority members were Liberals. 
 Language also continued to be a factor that marginalized newcomers to the province. 
Quebec schools were to exemplify the Francophone vision by equipping students of all cultural 
communities with the French language skills necessary to contribute to the common Quebec 
identity.  In the PQ government’s Plan of Action 1998–2002, the Francophone aspects of Quebec 
life were to override all others in order to ensure the survival of French Quebec. Therefore, the 
government made it a policy that schools and other educational institutions must present French 
as the more favourable linguistic option (Quebec, 1998). 
 After the events of September 11, 2001, the PQ struggled against racism in Quebec by 
mobilizing various government institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to 
counteract potential xenophobic reactions. Despite these efforts, and preceding the war in Iraq, 
Quebec residents of Iraqi origin feared that they would be “incarcerated as enemies of the state” 
if Canada, and by proxy Quebec, became too involved in the fight overseas (Labelle, 2003).  
However, my study emphasizes the pre-9/11 period because that was a separate factor that 
contributed to suspicion of (particular type) of immigrant in Quebec. However, political frames 
are operationalized by re-activating information that the frame recipients already know. In other 
words, political parties had already generated a level of resentment towards immigrants before 
and during the referendum period, particularly towards those who were not of Caucasian decent.  
9/11 played upon aspects of framing, which was outlined in the theoretical section of this thesis. 
Evoking sentiments towards a particular population through framing may amplify particular 
emotions towards immigrant groups. Therefore, any pre-existing understandings may have 
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prepared people to feel in a particular way towards immigrants. While this evidence may be 
circumstantial, is important because, in the case of Quebec, the feedback loop was locked-in by 
the referendum process and continuously cycled attitudes thereafter.  
 One could argue that the logic of tensions started around the 1995 referendum continued 
in the 2000s, with the debates surrounding ‘reasonable accommodation’ of cultural differences 
and the passing of a ‘code of conduct’ by the town of Hérouxville (Duerr, 2011). In 2007, 
Hérouxville adopted a code of conduct for those living within its municipality. Commonly 
known as “The Standards”, this code defined immigrant integration through a one-sided 
approach, in which immigrants coming to the region have to abide by “The Standards” set forth 
by the town (Nieguth and Lacassagne, 2009). Such standards rejected things such as violence 
against women and children, abstinence, a lack of knowledge about Christian traditions, and an 
interest in religious schools.  Many of the qualities rejected by “The Standards” were based on 
the stereotypes of an “extremist, radical, and violent Muslim”, which was circulated by Western 
media post 9/11(Nieguth and Lacassagne, 2009). Within Hérouxville, immigrants presented as a 
potential threat to the dominant norms of the community, in which  “The Standards” normalized 
and protected the community’s (constructed) collective identity against the arriving ‘other’.  The 
construction of ‘the other’ in Hérouxville should be understood as part of a larger battle between 
national identity and immigration in Quebec (Nieguth and Lacassagne, 2009). Such a code that 
prohibited ‘non-Western’ practices was indicative of a greater population’s anxiety about the 
threats other cultural practices posed to the national culture of Quebec.   
 The political landscape that extends beyond formal policy and the media has also 
highlighted the ethnic nationalism that persists within Quebec. Macpherson argues that ethnic 
nationalism could be viewed as “le nationalisme identitaire”—identity nationalism...[yet]... it’s 
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the same old insecure, defensive nationalism of protecting ‘us’ against the exaggerated threat of 
‘them’” (2007). While derogatory language was not found throughout the analysis of 
government speeches and documents, many of the current and former members of the PQ, or the 
sovereignty movement, made contentious statements regarding ethnicity in the media.  In 2007, 
former PQ leader Andre Boisclair used the term “les yeux brides”, which exists as a derogatory 
expression about “slanting eyes”, and was obviously perceived as a slight toward people from 
East Asia (Robitaille, 2007). In March of 2015, PQ leader Pierre Karl Péladeau speculated that 
immigrants were harming the sovereignty movement. He stated that they wouldn’t “have 25 
years ahead [of us] to realize sovereignty...with demographics, with immigration, it’s clear [we] 
lose a riding each year...[We the French] would like to have better control, but let’s not fool 
ourselves” (Authier, 2015).  
 The preceding case study demonstrated the outcomes of the independence referendum in 
Quebec.  While only a few examples of the hundreds of samples available have been chosen, this 
evidence successfully demonstrates the political environment that exists in Quebec from a 
particular perspective.  The first section of this case study provided a brief history and 
comparison of differing immigration policies in Quebec and Canada. Following this, the chapter 
linked to the referendum period and outlined the relationship between the PQ and immigrants 
during the referendum process. The third section  reviewed the post referendum period in order 
to demonstrate how the referendum locked-in a particular political discourse of the PQ towards 
immigrants.  Ultimately, this case study highlighted that the discourse used during the 
referendum was locked in by the referendum itself, consequently creating a feedback loop, which 
impacted policy development and discourse towards immigrants in Quebec. Lastly, this 
particular case study highlighted that while the sovereignty movement persists in Quebec, the 
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possibility that immigrants will remain to be seen as outsiders to the PQ is very high, due to the 
feedback loop being locked in place within society. 
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Chapter 5: Catalonia Case Study 	
 Amongst the case studies presented, Catalan SSNPs appear to represent the middle 
ground between the SSNPs in Quebec and those in Scotland in regards to attitudes and policies 
directed towards immigrants. While Catalonia practices some assimilation policies in regards to 
immigration, it has also implemented more open immigration practices than the Spanish central 
government under the People’s Party (Partido Popular or PP) in Madrid. In comparison to the PQ 
in Quebec, discursive examples that may appear offensive to immigrant and minority groups are 
not as prominent in the sub-state nation’s main nationalist party, Convergence and Union or 
Convergència i Unión (CiU), rhetoric. Further, the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy present in my 
previous analysis of the PQ discourse is not as prevalent in CiU politics. While only five percent 
of immigrants see themselves as holding a Catalan identity over a Spanish identity, some 
evidence depicts a shared emotional bond between those born in Catalonia and those not, which 
is unique to this case study (MacInnes, 2006). This emotional bond has evolved as a result of the 
political mobilization of immigrant groups during the sovereignty movement and will be 
discussed in this case study analysis.  These factors evidently influenced how immigrants were 
framed in Catalan’s November 2014 Independence Referendum and, by consequence, immigrant 
involvement in the sovereignty movement.  
 The first section of my case study outlines a brief history of immigration policy in 
Catalonia in order to understand link to the 2014 referendum itself. The second section of the 
case study discusses the independence referendum period and emphasizes the relationship 
between the CiU and immigrants during the process. In this section, I argue how the referendum 
period ultimately locks-in political discourse towards immigrants. The third section offers some 
predictions to how the locked-in discourse may continue post-referendum. This section also 
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examines how immigrants have become involved in the sovereignty movement since the 
November 2014 Referendum, due to their emotional bond and political mobilization during the 
referendum process.   
5. 1 Political Developments on Immigration in Catalonia 		 Catalonia began to develop its own political competencies after Spain’s democratic 
transition in the late 1970s. Throughout the Franco era, Catalan identity and autonomy were 
stifled.  The CiU was a key political party throughout the initial democratic transition and 
beyond, having governed Catalonia from 1980 to 2003xv. Foreign immigration was not a 
particularly salient issue during democratic transition, as immigration rates did not increase until 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was not until 1985 that the Spanish Parliament passed their first 
act on immigration with the “Act on Foreign Nationals (Ley de Extranjería de 1985)”.  In 
response to the immigration concerns and policies put forth by the Spanish Government, Catalan 
government adopted its own immigration policy, in which the immigrants were framed as both 
“beneficial to the economy and Catalan nation” (Hepburn, 2011: 517). During these early stages 
of democracy, the Catalan government began preparations for what would become an 
unprecedented influx of immigration from outside of Spain. Throughout the first decade of the 
21st century, immigration swelled at an exceptional rate in Catalonia as the immigrant 
population grew from about 200,000 people to more than 1 million people (Hepburn, 2011). In 
the year 2000, immigrants made up for about 2.9% of Catalonia’s population, but by 2011 they 
had reached almost 16% of the populace (Climent-Ferrando, 2012). 
 Such an influx can explain why Catalonia advocated for greater control in regards to 
immigrant management within their region, though enhanced autonomy on immigration issues 
has been among Catalan demands since the transition. CiU governments from 1980 to 2003 
		 59	
accepted the arrival of immigrants and pursued resources to support their integration into Catalan 
society, as the 1978 Spanish Constitution did not outline immigration capacities that delimited 
governance and policy management amongst the first regional Statutes of Autonomy (Spain, 
1978). Therefore, immigration in Spain, and by consequence in Catalonia, arose as an 
administrative issue in the 1990s and became a political and social issue in the next decade 
(Climent-Ferrando, 2012).  
 At first, the Catalan Government focused on managing immigration within the limits of 
its Statute of Autonomy. In the 1980s, the CiU ratified a language ‘normalisation’ law with aims 
to integrate “the non-Catalan population into the Catalan culture”, and to avoid the formation of 
‘cultural ghettos’ (MacInnes, 2006). At this time, the CiU also supported immigrants with 
welfare state services and offered them free Catalan language classes. Such efforts made the 
ability to speak Catalan perceived to be a “badge of achieved status” (Keating, 2001). Following 
the Franco era, there was sense of revitalized nationalism in the region and with it a new strategic 
vision for immigration. Such a strategy included a nation that was created by all members of 
Catalan society, regardless of origin. Catalonia, like Quebec has been shaped through 
immigration and by its relationship to the central government in Madrid, but is also divided 
along language and identity lines. Thus, Catalonia has developed its own immigration 
capabilities, despite the Spanish central government, to suit its own nationalist project.  
 The way immigration powers are arranged between the autonomous regions and the 
central Spanish government is a ‘deep-rooted issue’ in Spain and Catalonia, in which decisions 
surrounding such policies and practices are usually met with controversy (Climent-Ferrando, 
2012).   The Spanish government is responsible for border control, immigration flow and 
citizenship/nationality, while the Catalan government is in charge of accommodation and/or 
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integration of immigrants into their region. The nationalist project built under the CiU has, 
therefore, focused on accommodating immigrants, while also encouraging policies of 
acceptance, integration, and citizenship.  The administrative distribution of immigration 
capacities at each governmental level, however, is ambiguous, as they were not debated during 
constitutional negotiations after the Franco era. Such constitutional ambiguities have exacerbated 
political tensions between the central government and its sub-state national regions counterparts, 
especially in regards to diverging views on immigration practices.xvi 
  As a distinct society within Spain, Catalonia has created its own approach to diversity 
management. Catalonia must maintain its own language and culture that differs from the 
mainstream Spanish language and culture. In order for Catalonia to utilize immigration to the 
betterment of its nationalist project, it must have greater control over immigration policies. As 
such, immigration has been a salient issue in Catalan national politics for the past two decades.  
 In 2001, in response to the restrictive immigration policies put in place by the Spanish 
government (under Aznar’s PP), the CiU created an immigration policy draft that better 
emphasized social rights and citizenship for immigrants than the state immigration law (Sedura I 
Mas 2001).  Similarly, the process of immigration policies being developed by sub-state national 
parties in response to those developed by central governments also occurred within Quebec and 
Scotland in response to Canada and the UK’s policies respectively. Catalonia applied an 
accommodating approach to immigration that was followed by the tripartite government of the 
PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya), ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) and IC-V 
(Iniciativa per Catalunya – Verds) upon their election in 2003. This coalition government 
developed the Immigration and Citizenship Plan 2005-2008 (Generalitat 2005).  
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  The Citizenship Plan 2005-2008 (the Plan), created two novel structural changes with 
regards to immigration in Catalonia.  Firstly, the Plan provided with its own budget along with a 
complete policy framework to support it. Second, it implemented its own approach to citizenship 
within the region, whereas in order to be incorporated into the politics of the region immigrants 
simple had to register in the local registrar office, or padró. Catalan policy developed in 
contradiction to the Spanish policies, whereby once immigrants registered it meant they were 
willing to commit to sharing Catalonia as a community with all residents. This tactic created a 
new link to nationality at the regional level, rather than to the Spanish State. Ultimately, the plan 
began a new era in immigration policies in Catalonia, as it highlighted an important component 
in Catalan politics; the development of their own immigration strategies separate from the central 
government in Madrid.  
 An important aspect of the Plan is the concept of resident citizenship. This concept is 
common amongst sub-state national regions and is utilized in all three of the regions analyzed in 
my thesis. Resident citizenship allows national regions to offer a sense of belonging through 
‘theoretical’ citizenship in the region (Hepburn, 2011). In this way, the Catalan government can 
offer residency in Catalonia without the authority to offer citizenship to Spain (Climent-
Ferrando, 2012). Such a strategy frames the newcomer as a part of the national fabric and would 
theoretically encourage their allegiance to the Catalan region rather than the Spanish state. 
Resident citizenship is therefore intended to produce symbolic social cohesion in the region.  
 The notion that all persons, regardless of their country of origin, would be considered 
citizens of Catalonia is significant in two ways. Firstly, this philosophy acts as a useful nation-
building tool when creating the Catalan social fabric. Similar nation-building tools have also 
used by Quebec and Scotland. Secondly, it is a nuanced approach to opposing the political 
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philosophy of the Spanish State. Catalan ‘citizenship’, in which immigrants referred to as “nous 
ciutadans” (new citizens) become part of the Catalan public reality. This frames a sense of their 
belonging to the region (Climent-Ferrando, 2012). While the concept may allow for more 
immigrant involvement in public life, however, it cannot provide the juridical, economic, and 
social equality needed by ‘new citizens’. In order to access all social services and be represented 
in public institutions, immigrants still need to be naturalized through the Spanish state to access 
all public and legal capacities of the region.  
 In this regard, education becomes integral in fully incorporating immigrants into the 
Catalan national fabric. In 2004, the Catalan regional government’s Department of Education 
developed its Language and Social Cohesion Plan (Generalitat, 2004) that would ensure 
immigrant children were incorporated into society by the instruction of the Catalan language and 
would receive some supports in the development of student’s first language. The latter was not 
seen in the Quebec example.  
 Similar to Quebec, language is intertwined with immigration politics in Catalonia. 
Catalan politics, however, appear to demonstrate  more accomodating policies towards 
immigrants than those found in Quebec. Catalonia’s 2005-2008 Citizenship and Immigration 
Plan laid the ground for Catalan to be the communal language or “llengua comuna” in the region 
(Generalitat, 2005).  Catalan soon became the language used in the public space and the 
language all citizens shared in the region. The initial concept brought forth by the Plan was 
institutionalized in the in The National Agreement on Immigration (Pacte Nacional per a la 
Immigració) (Generalitat, 2008) and in the Llei d’acollida de les persones immigrades i 
retornades a Catalunya (Generalitat, 2009).  
 In 2006, Catalonia and Spain negotiated a new Statute of Autonomy for the region. The 
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2006 Statute granted the region certain powers over immigration, including the reception and 
socioeconomic integration of immigrants (Generalitat, 2006: Article 138).  From these powers, 
the Catalan government developed the Pact for Immigration (the Pact) in 2008. The 2008 Pact 
stated that all those who have lived in the region for more than three years could potentially 
obtain definitive residency if they spoke and understood Catalan.   While the definition of 
‘definitive residency’ is unclear, as the Spanish government technically awards permanent 
residency, the language in the Pact contradicts that of the Spanish Central Government. 
Accordingly, permanent residence is rewarded to persons living in Spain after two years for 
nationals of Latin America, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, or Portugal, and ten 
years (five years for refugees) for all remaining nationalities. While the CiU supported the Pact, 
the right-wing Catalan PP was in opposition and presented a much more restrictive and security-
focused policy on immigration.  Notably, the Catalan PP were a regional extension of the state-
wide PP, the main opposition party at the time, demonstrating that a key party at the centre of 
government was opposed to the policies put forward by the Pact.  
 The increase in regional government control of immigration in Catalonia polarized the 
immigration issue, redirecting the attitudes of the CiU. From a discursive standpoint, Catalan 
nationalism was never immune to ethnic chauvinism. From its political beginnings, 
representatives of the CiU made some questionable statements in regards to ‘outsiders’ entering 
and remaining in Catalonia. As early as 1976, Jordi Pujolxvii described ‘immigrants’ (who were at 
the time were mostly Spanish people from Andalusia) as “ignorant, ‘mentally poor’ people, 
incapable of self-control or creativity who threatened to ‘destroy’ Catalonia” (MacInnes, 2006).  
While this statement, was later retracted by Pujol, different statements were made towards other 
immigrant groups or other political affiliations in order to garner support (Goligorsky, 2002; and  
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MacInnes, 2006). Indeed, like politicians in Quebec, some of Pujol statements were filled with 
contradictions.  
 Once in power, Pujol’s conflicting statements did not end. In 2001, when immigration 
was due to increase substantially in Catalonia, Pujol claimed that the region was again threatened 
by the influx of immigrants. This time, however, they came from parts of North Africa rather 
than Andalusia. In reference to integration (or assimilation) of this particular immigrant group, 
Pujol was quoted as saying that “if an immigrant doesn't adapt, you need to respond with ‘zero 
tolerance’” (MacInnes, 2006). To Pujol, immigrant groups (particularly those of Muslim origin) 
should be made to speak Catalan and not Spanish, as “every country has its norms and outsiders 
shouldn't be allowed to break them” (MacInnes, 2006). Furthermore, various CiU representatives 
later outlined a connection between immigration and criminal behaviour, warning that ‘cultural 
mixing’ could damage Catalonia's ‘distinctive personality’ (MacInnes, 2006).   
 Other CiU ‘militants’ also notoriously made questionable comments, such as Pujol’s 
wife, Marta Ferrusola. Ferrusola condemned newcomer Muslims as imposing their culture on the 
region, stating that "they want to impose their own way [and] all they know how to say is: 'Give 
me something to eat"(Tremlett, 2001). Ferrusola’s claim was that the majority of social security 
payments were going to immigrant families and that "these benefits go to people who do not 
even know what Catalonia is” (Tremlett, 2001).  Similar views on immigration were shared by a 
senior figure in Catalan separatism, the former Regional Parliamentary President and Secretary 
of the Catalan Republican left, Heribert Barrera. Barrera also believed “that the region would 
disappear under the weight of immigration” (Tremlett, 2001).  Ironically, these statements were 
made prior to the large influx of immigrants that followed in the succeeding decade (2000-2011).   
 Nevertheless, various nationalist parties from both the left and right end of the political 
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spectrum populate the Catalan political sphere. Other nationalists on the left denounced such 
statements, stating that: “immigrants realized that Catalonia is a society with a distinct 
personality and integrated, making this cause their own, without having to give up anything” 
(Colomines I Companie, 2001).  The discursive divide amongst party mentalities is obvious in 
the policy development prior to the independence referendum in November 2014. While 
attitudes towards immigrants (from the CiU) were contentious at times, they were not 
representative of the whole scope of nationalist politics in Catalonia. These examples of political 
discourse provide some insight into contradicting political attitudes before the referendum. 
 Despite efforts made to avoid fragmentation and ensure (social) cohesion in promoting 
the Catalan identity “new immigration brings with it new problems” (Pujol 2004). Pujol 
continuously argued that the region must “find a policy of integration” (2004), because even 
though Catalonia receives many immigrants, a policy of respect towards (Catalan) identity as a 
country is still paramount.  Such a policy on integration and respect towards Catalan identity was 
considered the balance between rights and responsibilities (Pujol, 2004). The province of Quebec 
also sought to find policies to welcome and integrate newcomers. However, Quebec struggled to 
actually incorporate immigrants as welcomed insiders within the region.  
 Correspondingly, such ‘welcoming attitudes’ in Catalonia are sometimes akin to 
assimilation, as “for the CiU, the goal was not to achieve a multicultural society, but to 
assimilate immigrants into the Catalan community so that the nation remained culturally distinct 
from the rest of Spain” (CiU, 2008).  The stress on assimilation has bordered towards a more 
restrictive representation of citizenship. Deliberations concerning the revised Statute showed the 
CiU party arguing that only immigrants with familiarity of the Catalan language should be given 
equal access to social services (Hens, 2006). Furthermore, the CiU has been seen suggesting a 
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system of social benefits and rewards for ‘dutiful’ immigrants along with a ‘voluntary contract’ 
for immigrants that would reward knowledge of Catalan language with better access to public 
services (The Economist, 4 February, 2010). 
  While the CiU has been moderately successful in pursuing immigrants as supporters of 
the Catalan nation-building project; the party has yet to elect an immigrant to the Catalan 
Parliament (Hepburn, 2011).  The CiU has so far made only a modest effort to garner electoral 
support amongst immigrant groups (Velten, 2006).  The same can be said for most parties in 
Catalonia, as only a single political party (the ERC Party) in the region has developed official 
relationships to immigrant associations (Velten, 2006).  In fact, the majority of parliamentary 
representatives have been born in Catalonia, save for Mohammed Chaib.  Chaib, a member of 
the ERC Party, was elected in November 2006 and expressed the desire “to help Muslim 
immigrants find a balance between cultures” (Hens, 2006). While making voting rights and the 
civic and political participation of immigrants a central theme in its election campaigns, the ERC 
used Chaib to “promote understanding between the Catalan people and immigrants” (Hens, 
2006).  
 The time before the referendum highlights the complex relationship between immigrant 
groups and the various political parties in Catalonia, particularly the CiU. The re-election of the 
CiU (under Artur Mas in 2010) and consequent rise in the sovereignty movement, however, 
created a different political climate for many immigrant voters. The decision to allow all 
immigrants (and minors) to vote in the independence referendum had unprecedented outcomes 
on their involvement in the referendum period itself and consequently, the way in which sub-
state national parties framed them.  
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5. 2 The Plebiscite Independence Referendum 
  
In October 2014, the president of Catalonia’s regional CiU government, Artur Mas, 
officially signed a ruling for a referendum on Catalonia’s independence, despite the appeal made 
by the Spanish government to the Constitutional Court.  Catalans were encouraged by the 
independence referendum in Scotland, and undeterred by the negative outcome. The 
independence referendum in Catalonia was not a constitutionally binding process, but a "process 
of citizen participation" (Kassam, 2014).  After the Spanish Constitutional Court suspended the 
‘non-referendary popular consultation’, it was re-labeled as a participatory process by the 
Government of Catalonia. Catalonia has the ability it to implement policies in specific domains, 
but does not have the constitutional power to secede from the country or to hold a referendum on 
such an issue without permission from Madrid. This stipulation means that constitutionally, the 
independence referendum is invalid. Despite this and the efforts made by the Spanish 
Government (which further highlighted the contentious relationship between the multinational 
state and the sub-state), the CiU government continued with the process.   
Catalonia’s informal independence referendum, framed as a non-binding civil society 
initiative, was held on November 9, 2014. The referendum was unique for being a simulation of 
a binding plebiscite, but also for its inclusion of minors (aged 16 and17) and immigrants (who 
have lived in Catalonia for over a year if they come from another EU country, and over three 
years if they are from non-EU countries) in the vote, which under Spanish law would not have 
been possible.  
 Throughout the referendum campaign it was difficult to determine how immigrant groups 
would vote. As was the case in both Quebec and Scotland, support for Catalan independence was 
not unanimous. Results from the Catalan Political Opinion Barometer two-weeks prior to the 
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referendum vote date, indicated how cultural background (i.e. language) may also influence 
independence support.  Voters that indicated Catalan as their primary language largely favoured 
independence at 70 percent, but among bilingual speakers this support decreased to 50 percent 
and an even further 20 percent amongst Spanish only speakers (CIS, 2014). Immigrant 
community leaders based their support for or against independence based on their pre-existing 
loyalties to their local political parties (Munoz, 2014). It was therefore not clear how immigrant 
voters would choose. Despite being permitted to vote they were still required to register their 
residency status prior to the referendum vote (Munoz, 2014).  
 Discursive evidence collected from media sources prior to immigrants being included in 
the vote highlight the level of diversity in immigrant opinion towards independence. A 
spokesperson from a settlement organization in Barcelona argued that “for most of the 
immigrants we help, their only preoccupations now are finding a job, making sure their papers 
are in order and meeting their basic need… Indeed, their minds and goals are very far from a 
political debate that they don’t even have the right to vote in” (Minder, 2012). Some other 
immigrant groups, such as Sikh immigrants, however, held greater empathy for the sovereignty 
movement, based on similar experiences in their home countries. Likewise, Pakistanis living in 
Barcelona who come from Punjab, a region that also shares similar nationalist aspirations could 
also understand and share the process (Minder, 2012).  Furthermore, some immigrants are fluent 
in Spanish but prefer to speak Catalan (Minder, 2012). This demonstrates an important linguistic 
connection with Catalonia.   
 For many South Americans, however, the sentiment for independence was complicated 
by an attachment or resentment toward the "motherland" Spain (Giner, 2014). Some believed in 
the sovereignty movement, but wanted independence to be achieved through more consultation 
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and not a plebiscite vote, while some others rejected it outright, in favour of a united Spain.  
Furthermore, some blamed the economy for the fervent resurgence of nationalist feeling in the 
region (Giner, 2014). It is important to note, however, that while I can make general assumptions 
towards the voting patterns of particular groups, it is impossible to completely generalize the 
sentiments of an entire population of immigrant voters.  
 While opinions among immigrant groups varied, an important theme arose throughout the 
Catalonian case study: the ‘Contagio Emocional’ or rather the Emotion Contagion (Giner, 2014). 
Within this concept the group sentiment of one population becomes contagious to the other. In 
this vein, immigrants adopt a nationalist fervour through their interaction with sovereigntist 
groups or they adopt the same anti-independence zeal through their connection with those in 
favour of a united Spain. In this case, so it seems, the independence process is less about identity 
and more about political mobilization. Separatist political parties in Catalonia have, therefore, 
tried to socialize immigrants through a civic identity based on equality and opportunity, while 
also incorporating the Catalan language. In general, the nationalist parties have largely 
abandoned their ethnicity-based speeches with a view to include immigrants in their political 
ranks.  
 For newer immigrant groups, identity ties to the Catalan region may not be as strong as 
they are to the Spanish Crown. During this referendum process, however, immigrant groups were 
given the opportunity to participate in an important political process for the first time, something 
the Spanish government had yet to offer them.  Moreover, both pro- and anti-independence 
groups and parties created campaigns that were directed towards these communities. Since talks 
of the referendum began, political leaders, such as Artur Mas, advocated for the benefits of 
including immigrants (and minors in the vote) in the sovereignty movement. Indeed, the 
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Generalitat claimed that if independence were won, immigrants would become citizens of 
Catalonia and therefore be eligible to obtain a passport to (potentially) an EU country (Munoz, 
2014). Providing foreigners with the opportunity to vote, along with a promise that if 
independence is achieved their citizenship will be granted, may result in a favourable outcome 
for independence. For many undecided voters, as many did not care if they were Spanish or 
Catalan, the possibility of acquiring a European passport would be an important incentive.  
 Throughout the referendum campaign political pandering to immigrant groups was a 
common theme. Various Spanish media outlets suggested that the CiU Plan’s to accommodate 
the teachings of Islam and Arabic and Berber languages in public schools that had a large 
percentage of Muslim students was created in order to garner support from these immigrant 
communities (Munoz, 2014).  Furthermore, throughout the campaign Jorge Fernández Díaz, the 
Spanish Minister of the Interior, alleged that "Nous Catalans" (New Catalans; a pro-
independence group), was promising ‘paradise on earth’ to Muslim voters living in Catalonia in 
pursuance of their support (Munoz, 2014).  Such comments did not serve Fernandez Diaz well as 
he was a known member of the Catholic group Opus Dei and a Spanish minister interfering with 
Catalan politics.  Nous Catalans retorted by condemning the minister for racism, while 
contesting that their campaign activities were transparent and democratic (Munoz, 2014).  
 Ultimately, the Catalonian case study is unable to show the quantitative data on how 
immigrants voted in the referendum. More specifically, Catalonia, does not poll based on ethnic 
basis, so it is not possible to find exact data on immigrant voting patterns. Unlike Quebec, 
immigrants were not framed as outsiders in the referendum process, therefore, even polls do not 
ask about ethnicity. Many immigrants in Catalonia were incorporated into the political 
environment and as such took part in pro- or anti-independence rallies based mostly on their 
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political allegiances with local parties (Munoz, 2014). Without the ‘us versus them’ mentality, 
negative frames towards immigrants were not present, as immigrants were no longer seen as 
outsiders. The referendum highlighted that discourse towards immigrants throughout the process 
was inclusive, as they were involved in the political movements on either side and had the ability 
to vote. The inclusiveness of this process may have had something to do with the relationship of 
Catalan nationalism toward immigrants in the preceding period. While discursive evidence 
shows some contradictions in attitudes towards immigrants in the CiU, other SSNPs voicing 
more inclusive attitudes and policies attempted to incorporate immigrants into the Catalan 
identity and ‘emocion’.  
 While the vote was only a plebiscite, the pro-independence vote was successful. 
Significantly, the independence referendum process created a bond among all those living in 
Catalonia, while allowing for the political socialization of immigrant groups.  The next section 
offers further insight into the present day implications of the immigrant involvement in the 
referendum process. 
5. 3 Post-Referendum Catalonia: Predictions and Observations 
  This section offers some tentative predictions on how policy development will continue 
in the post referendum period, based on how political discourse towards immigrants was locked-
in during the referendum. This section also offers observations from the time of the referendum 
until the end of 2015.  While it is too soon after the referendum to witness any major policy 
developments, and as the latest immigrant polices were completed in 2013 with a view to 
continue into 2016, I offer my predictions for the Catalan Case.  I predict a similar trend for 
policy development in Catalonia based on observations with regards to policy development in 
Quebec following its independence referendum. In Quebec, as immigrants were portrayed 
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negatively in the public statements of some nationalist Québécois politicians in the debates 
before and during the referendum periods, they continued to be treated the same afterward.  
Despite failed attempts at mending the relationship, the PQ continued to perpetuate a negative 
discourse toward them. This experience highlights the referendum as a lock-in mechanism. I 
should expect a similar sequence of events to arise in Catalonia, but with the opposite effect. In 
Catalonia, immigrants were involved in the referendum process and positively framed 
throughout. The referendum locks in the discourse, with attitudes towards immigration often 
frozen as a result. Correspondingly, the independence movement was met with an even more 
fervent attitude from immigrant groups after the referendum.  
 The latest regional elections in Catalonia elected a new sovereigntist party, Together for 
Yes, under Artur Mas. The same rhetoric that was found under the (now disbanded) CiU should 
be prevalent in current Catalan politics, but with an even more ardent attitude to include 
immigrants. Moreover, the current Spanish government continues to be led by the PP, which has 
been known to embrace borderline xenophobic mandates and discourse. Based on my theoretical 
assumptions this should mean that the Catalan nationalist parties are even more likely to continue 
their welcoming attitudes towards immigrants.  The Catalan PP, which has strong ties to the 
Spanish PP, received the least support in the September 2015 elections. The lack of this support   
signified an increase in nationalist aspirations and a decrease in support towards exclusive 
immigrant notions.  
 The latest election was another checkpoint on the road to sovereignty for Catalonia. 
Following the results of the November 2014 referendum, Artur Mas stated he would hold 
plebiscitary elections in the months to follow.  The political implications from this are three-fold. 
First, it would mean a coalition would have to be formed by various nationalist parties, beyond 
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that of the CiU. Second, if this coalition won, they intended to leave Spain within18 months of 
the election. Third, the same inclusionary rhetoric and tactics that were used to involve 
immigrants in the referendum process should be present in the election campaigns. Notably, the 
CiU was dissolved in June 2015, with its founding counterparts running separately.  A new 
coalition formed by the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC), Republican Left of 
Catalonia (ERC), Democrats of Catalonia (DC) and Left Movement (MES) ran under the 
Together for Yes (Junts pel Si) banner for the election. Together for Yes ran with Artur Mas as 
the presidential candidate. The Democratic Union of Catalonia ran without another party 
affiliation.  
  Along with a zealous anti-Madrid attitude, 2015 election campaigns courted immigrant 
votes throughout the regional elections. Together for Yes, ensured it supplied electoral pamphlets 
in Arabic, Chinese and Urdu. The Catalan National Assembly (ANC), a large civic group in 
favour of independence with strong ties to the ‘Together for Yes’ coalition, had a department 
dedicated to immigrants. The campaigns created connections between native Catalans and those 
from Latin America, Asia, and Africa allowing everyone to feel as ‘compatriots’ (Bosque, 2015). 
Many of these populations also want to be ‘free from Spanish rule’ and be the ‘founding fathers’ 
of the Catalan republic (Bosque, 2015). Catalan’s positive rhetoric towards immigration 
throughout the referendum and its policies to teach immigrants the Catalan language, as well as 
the region's history and traditions, have contributed to its emotional contagion in the 
independence movement. The September 2015 elections saw unprecedented activity at the polls 
with a 77.4 percent turnout rate. The pro-independence lists garnered 48 percent of the votes and 
won 72 seats out of 135, whereas unionist lists obtained 39 percent of the votes and 52 seats. 
This election was the conclusion of four years of political mobilization by both parties, of all 
		 74	
persons, including immigrant voter groups. 
 The preceding case study demonstrates the development of minority nationalist-
immigrant political dynamic in relation to the informal, non-binding independence referendum in 
Catalonia. The first section of my case study outlined the political developments in Catalonia 
with regards to immigration. The second section of this case study discussed the independence 
referendum period and highlighted an important point to Catalan Nationalism – the emotional 
contagion. This emotional component extends the case study beyond the civic and ethnic 
nationalism into an analysis of political mobilization by the nationalist parties in Catalonia and 
how these emotions were locked in by the referendum period. The third section reviewed the 
post referendum period to understand how the political discourse of the nationalist coalitions 
towards immigrants in Catalonia is locked-in during the referendum.  This consequently 
impacted the way discourse was positively directed towards immigrants in Catalonia along with 
subsequent political campaigns. I predict that policy towards immigrants will develop 
accordingly, as they did in the Quebec case, except with a more positive view.  
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Chapter 6: Scotland 
 Scotland exemplifies the most welcoming nationalist project among the case studies. 
Political parties within the region, particularly the Scottish National Party (SNP), offer the most 
inclusive platforms in regards to immigration of the case studies examined here.  As such, the 
SNP encourages population growth through multiculturalism and immigration, in opposition to 
the central policies of the British Government. Distinguishing Scottish politics from the other 
two cases is its concentration on territorial markers, as Scottish identity is not as strongly linked 
to linguistic and cultural factors. This aspect of Scottish politics makes it a nuanced addition to 
my case studies as it highlights how the lock-in mechanism can be understood in different 
political contexts.  
 The first section of the case study begins by outlining how immigration is conceptualized 
differently in British and Scottish settings. Subsequently, I offer a brief history of immigration 
policy in Scotland in order to portray its effects on discourse and immigrant participation in the 
independence referendum. This first section also highlights Scotland’s contentious relationship 
with the United Kingdom. The second section of the case study discusses the independence 
referendum period. Immigrants are well incorporated into the Scottish sovereignty movement 
and their involvement in the referendum period is indicative of the relationship between the SNP 
and immigrants. The Scottish independence referendum showcases an important link between 
welcoming political discourse and the way in which immigrants vote. Similar to the results in the 
Catalan case, I show how the independence referendum process created a bond among all those 
living in Scotland while allowing for the political socialization of immigrant groups. This bond 
explains how discourse can be locked in throughout the referendum campaign.  The third section 
evaluates how immigrant involvement in the sovereignty movement contributes to an inclusive 
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dialogue thereafter.  This section demonstrates how the political developments of the SNP after 
the independence referendum process were affected by the campaign. Ultimately, this section 
shows the continuation of the locked-in discourse in the post referendum period from the time of 
the referendum until the end of 2015. 
6. 1 Immigration Conceptions and Developments in Scotland 	
 Scotland hosts a smaller number of immigrants than Quebec and Catalonia. However, net 
immigration to Scotland has increased over the past 40 years, with the biggest influx arriving 
between 2001 and 2011 (Scotland, 2014). Immigrants now represent seven percent of the 
Scottish population with the largest numbers coming from Poland and India. This trend was 
paralleled by the increase in immigration to the UK since the 1990s under the British Labour 
government’s immigration strategy (Davis, 2008).  While this immigration program was 
successful in recruiting high skilled workers through the creation of a points-based system, its 
policies have been criticized as pursuing economic interests over the needs and rights of migrants 
(Davis, 2008; and Somerville, 2007). Furthermore, the UK’s policies directed towards economic 
immigration have created more severe asylum requirements. Consequently, immigration 
regulations have been restricted as the result of four separate bills since 1999.  
 The influx of migrants to the UK has created different reactions in the Scottish and the 
English Media. While English media reports highlight that increased migration is received by 
fear, panic, and resentment, Scottish party statements and media reports have generally been 
welcoming (Hepburn, 2009). English media reveal a public perception of immigrants as being a 
“drain on the welfare state and difficult to integrate” (Hepburn, 2009: 521). Bailey argues that 
the English media has perpetuated a dichotomy of ‘us versus them’ by defining immigrants and 
asylum seekers as the ‘other’ (2005). The same dichotomy is not present in Scottish discourse. 
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The necessity for immigration to compensate for emigration and decreasing birth rates in 
Scotland contribute to the more positive mentality, even though the region receives a lower 
amount of immigrants per head than the rest of the UK (Wright, 2006).  The needs for 
immigration, as well as Scottish nationalist attitudes that differ from UK politics have created 
diverging attitudes from those found in England (Saeed et al., 1999; and Bond, 2006). These 
attitudes are reflected in the political discourse of main political parties.  
 A declining sense of ‘Britishness’ in Scotland represents the continued importance of the 
‘Scottish Question’ in UK constitutional politics (Hepburn and Rosie, 2014). Scholars argue that 
‘Scottishness’ rests primarily upon territorial or ‘civic’ markers, in particular where people were 
born and where they live (Kiely, Bechhofer, and McCrone, 2005; Bond, 2006; and Rosie and 
Bond, 2006).  In contrast with Quebec and Catalonia, Scottish identification does not emanate 
from cultural or linguistic markers but rather through territorial connection (Arrighi de 
Casanova, 2014; and Hepburn and Rosie, 2014). Accordingly, Scottish nationalist politicians 
emphasize place and the institutions of daily life, rather than cultural and linguistic aspects when 
referring to Scottish identity.  Indeed, Scottish political parties have actively welcomed 
newcomers to their region (Hepburn, 2009).  Scholars have noted that it is very likely that 
someone who is born, raised, and currently living in Scotland will not only self-identify as 
Scottish, but be accepted as Scottish by others regardless of ethnic origins (Hepburn and Rosie, 
2014). While Quebec and Catalonia have pursued policies related to civic identity, the evidence 
in Scottish case is markedly different in terms of politician’s commitment to a place of belonging 
for all those living in Scotland.  
 Of the three cases examined, Scotland has the least capacity to regulate policies around 
immigration and ethnic diversity. While Scottish government is able to offer input on a policy, 
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the Scotland Act of 1998 (the Act) stipulates that Westminster maintains final legislative powers.  
The Act assigns immigration, nationality, and asylum policies to Westminster (Barker, 2010). 
The Act offered Scotland more legislative and decision-making power but with limited financial 
capacities. With devolution, the Scottish Government, particularly under the SNP, took action on 
some aspects of immigration and other related areas, such as education and child welfare in order 
to support integration efforts at the regional level (Barker, 2010). 
 Scotland’s limited immigration capacities may be another reason why immigration is a 
fairly uncontested issue in the region. Without full control over the issue politicians need not 
polarize voters by pandering to fears about migration (Shin, 2011). By contrast such pandering 
can be noted in UK politics. At the UK level for example, Labour went from an “economically 
motivated liberalization of regulations” in 2001 to a more ‘managed’ control of immigration in 
2005 (Odmalm, 2012). This shift advocated for a more restrictive system that links immigration 
to enforcement, control, and punishment (Labour, 2010).  Comparatively, the Liberal Democrats 
promoted policies based on human rights issues in 2001,  but were framing illegal immigrants as 
a part of organized crime by 2010 (Odmalm, 2012; Grayson, 2010; and Liberal Democrats, 
2010). The UK Conservative Party has been unswerving in its avocation of stricter immigration 
controls (Conservative Party, 2010).  Indeed, the central message of the 2010 UK election was 
that immigration posed a threat to Britain and that it should be reduced.  
 At the Scottish level, regional parties have renounced immigration as a threat and suggest 
instead that immigration is necessary in tackling Scotland’s economic and demographic concerns 
(Hepburn, 2009; 2011).  Furthermore, Scottish politicians emphasize humanitarian principles in 
welcoming foreigners to Scotland, incorporating a discourse of belonging into parliamentary 
politics (Hepburn and Rosie, 2014). Due to a necessity for immigrants and a lack of direct 
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control over immigration, the political parties in Scotland are all ‘inclusive’ towards immigration 
(Hepburn, 2009).  The political parties in the region therefore do not have contentious views on 
immigration.  
 In contrast to the UK developing negative discourse towards immigration, Scottish Party 
manifestos continued to demonstrate its importance to the region.  In 2005, party manifestos 
demonstrated commitment to increase immigration in order to improve Scotland’s economic 
prospects (Hepburn and Rosie, 2014).  Notably, the term ‘New Scots’ became a regular part of 
the Scottish political rhetoric. This cemented the idea that those arriving from somewhere else 
belonged to the Scottish national fabric. While the SNP committed to “pursue an immigration 
policy that welcomes new Scots and encourages people to move back to Scotland” (SNP, 2005: 
6), all Scottish parties worked to spite British Government policies.  The Scottish Labour Party 
argued against the UK Labour’s more stringent line on immigration, which included 
fingerprinting, a ‘crackdown on abuse’, compulsory ID cards, and ‘secure borders’ (Scottish 
Labour, 2005: 52– 3). Similarly, the Scottish Liberal Democrats’ manifesto argued that: “we will 
work with the Scottish Executive to ensure that decisions taken at Westminster help and do not 
hinder Scotland’s drive to reverse population decline” (Scottish Liberal Democrats, 2005: 11).  
Even the Scottish Conservatives rarely attacked the region’s immigration policies. The political 
situation in Scotland differs strongly from that found in the UK where immigration, asylum, 
nationality, and multiculturalism have become strong points of cleavage.  
  With such contrasting views on immigration (and other issues) to the UK, Scottish 
independence has become the most salient issue in the region’s political rhetoric. Moreover, an 
important factor to national sovereignty includes full control over migration matters (Hepburn, 
2011).   In lieu of direct control over immigration, Scotland has augmented other policies that 
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can affect integration, such as education, that fall within Scottish policy competencies. When the 
SNPxviii obtained a majority movement in 2011, they put the plans in motion to pursue full 
autonomy from the UK government.  Scotland’s incapacity to effectively use immigration to 
attain national objectives became more obvious when the SNP took office in 2007. The lack of 
political capacities was matched by national interests to create a more open immigration policy 
and a more inclusive concept of citizenship.  In response to its limited policy-making capacity 
abilities, the SNP has promoted a devolved immigration policy for Scotland as a precursor to full 
independence that would give the region full control over migration.  This devolved immigration 
policy would allow the region to attract skilled workers (SNP, 2007). The goals for this policy 
are two-fold, as they would support economic growth in the region while championing diversity 
as an important Scottish value (SNP, 2007). This directly opposes the ‘failed’ multiculturalism 
that politicians have begun condemn in the UK (BBC, 2011). Members of the SNP, such as 
Justice Minister Kenny MacAskill, have demanded devolution of immigration policy on the 
grounds that Scotland’s “economic and social needs are different and distinct to the rest of the 
UK...as a nation of emigrants [the Scots] wish to see immigrants coming to Scotland dealt with 
kindness and compassion, not brutality and oppression” (Hepburn, 2009). MacAskill’s statement 
alluded to the contentious treatment of asylum seekers in Scotland, an issue within 
Westminster’s jurisdiction. 
 Furthermore, Scottish ministers met with the UK immigration minister to discuss how the 
point-based system already existing in the UK could be better designed to support Scotland’s 
population growth targets. However, despite their efforts, the UK would only commit to 
promoting Scotland as a place to live and to providing some supports with regards to temporary 
workers. Such commitments did not help the SNP’s aims to regionalise the points-based system 
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in efforts to devolve Scotland control (Scottish Government, 2009a). In the time leading up to 
the referendum such a policy did not come into place.  
 As previously stated, the Scottish political context hosts political elite that are “united and 
consistent in proclaiming their vision of an ‘inclusive’ Scotland” (Hussain and Miller, 2006: 27). 
Therefore, the SNP’s pro-immigration platform is not subject to contestation. It is also worth 
mentioning that there is no far-right anti-immigrant party in Scotland, which is distinct from the 
case of the British National Party in England (Hopkins, 2004). Indeed, there is no party that is 
even comparable to the ADQ in Quebec or the regional PP in Catalonia. To this end, the region 
provides a more fertile ground for inclusive immigrant policies. Even main opponents of the 
SNP have advocated for policies that suit a more diverse Scotland. For instance, in 2004 the 
Labour Party (the SNP’s main opponent) and the Liberal Democrats formed a coalition 
government that negotiated the ‘Fresh Talent’ initiative with the British government. This 
initiative enabled international students to apply for a two-year extension to their visa following 
graduation to seek employment (Hepburn, 2011). 
 The political context of Scotland differs significantly from that of Quebec and Catalonia, 
which has impacted how immigrants are integrated into the political sphere and how they were 
involved during the referendum process. Similar to other case studies, however, is that the main 
point of contention in the sub-state nationalist region exists between the sub state nation and the 
state, i.e. Scotland and the UK. Many of the policies introduced by the SNP, as I note below, 
were in contrast to measures put in place by the British government.  
 In general, the SNP posed its citizenship policy as more inclusive and welcoming than 
that of Westminster, while specifically criticising aspects of the central government’s policies 
(SNP, 2003a).  With regards to the British Government’s 2008 points-based system for skilled 
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immigrants, the SNP stipulated that this policy did not mirror “the needs, requirements and 
indeed the values of Scottish society” (Hepburn, 2011).  The SNP has also criticized the UK’s 
plans to restrict conditions for immigrants to access social services. The SNP disputed Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown’s proposal that would levy conditions on immigrants in order to access 
social services. Such conditions included community service similar to that imposed for a 
criminal offence (Tempest, 2007).   
 While Westminster continued to develop restrictive policies towards immigration and 
citizenship, pro-migration interests were emerging in Holyrood (Barker, 2010). Indeed, 
immigration in Scotland was framed (and perceived) as an important instrument in national 
development (Barker, 2010). With immigration being upheld by both the Scottish Labour Party 
and the SNP as an important motive for population growth (Barker, 2010), the Fresh Talent 
initiative was introduced in 2004 by Scottish First Minister Jack McConnell with a view to 
mitigate the projected population decline and to attract individuals with sought-after 
qualificationsxix. The SNP strived to differentiate itself, however, from the Scottish Labour Party 
by disparaging its ‘Fresh Talent’ initiative for its minimalist goals (Barker, 2010).  The SNP also 
stated that the Scottish Labour Party too closely mirrored London Labour’s policies that would 
hinder Scotland’s economic and demographic interests (Barker, 2010). Unlike many of the 
parties examined in the other case studies it is interesting to note that the parties in Scotland vie 
for votes by catering to immigration interests rather than to treat immigration as threat to the 
nationhood.  
 Furthermore, the SNP has contested the citizenship classes and loyalty oath the British 
government has put in place as a part of their ‘Proud to be British’ citizenship rules (SNP, 
2003b).  In opposition to UK policies, the SNP has promoted the idea of a dual identity for 
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newcomers.  The SNP has suggested that it makes senses for newcomers to Scotland to have a 
dual identity. New Scots can be both proud of being Scottish while retaining an affinity to their 
country of origin (SNP, 2003b).  If independence was achieved for Scotland, the SNP argued that 
immigrant rights would be expanded to complete access to public services and political 
participation. These rights were in stark contradiction to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s 
proposal that created conditions for immigrants to access social services such as undertaking 
community service (Hepburn, 2009).  
 In addition to the promotion of more inclusive policies, the SNP has proposed policies to 
establish more control of immigration, of which would include a special ‘Green Card’. Such 
policies would allow the Scottish government to “create a fair and efficient process for people 
coming to Scotland” (SNP 2003a: 30). The introduction of a Green Card also allows the Scottish 
government to establish a certain criteria for immigrants with a goal to augment the number 
skills-targeted immigrants in the region by up to 50,000 every year.  The Green Card would 
allow Scotland to “compete with other nations in the global market for non-EEA highly skilled 
workers and . . . encourage migrants to seek Scottish citizenship” (Scottish Government 2009b: 
24–25). It was further anticipated that the program would boost labour markets by allowing 
newcomer families to contribute to Scotland while stabilizing the declining population (SNP, 
2007).   
 Scotland’s immigration strategies, particularly those under the SNP, are influenced by 
party dynamics but also by wider state discourses, policies, and media coverage (Hepburn, 
2009).  In Scotland (and Catalonia), this can be seen through the parties’ criticisms of the central 
government’s perceived restrictive immigration policies, and the necessity for immigration 
policies in the regions in order to increase the size of the workforce (Hepburn, 2009).  In fact, 
		 84	
both the SNP and the CiU have attempted to situate themselves as more democratic and 
progressive than their national governments (Hepburn, 2009).  
 Notably, former SNP leader John Swinney accused the Blair government of being 
xenophobic due to the development of new immigration restrictions. Similar sentiments were 
echoed through the Scottish media as “the idea of Poles coming in as sort of hairy, cheap labour 
and taking jobs away from honest working men is a complete misconception” (Hepburn, 2009). 
These examples expose a comparable dynamic between public and political opinion in Scotland. 
Similarly, the CiU in Catalonia has also critiqued the Madrid government for creating a limited 
immigration policy that does not supported the integration of newcomers (Hepburn, 2009). 
 While the SNP has responded similarly to the central government as other parties do in 
Quebec and Catalonia, it stands alone in regards to the extent to which it encouraged the political 
participation of immigrants groups (Hepburn, 2011). Since 1995, the party has established 
periphery groups, such as the ‘Asian Scots for Independence’ and ‘Young Asian Scots for 
Independence’, in order to foster political support and participation amongst Asians and youth 
communities. Such endeavours have contributed to the political discourse that existed during the 
referendum surrounding the involvement of immigrant groups.  
 In 2007, the organizer of the Asian Scot for Independence, Bashir Ahmad, was the first 
member of an ethnic minority elected to the Scottish Parliament. In the 2010 election, the chief 
executive of the Scottish-Islamic Foundation was the SNP candidate in the general election. The 
promotion and inclusion of ethnic minorities in the SNP has increased support for the party 
amongst Scottish Muslim voters (Hepburn, 2009).   
 The SNP had previously gained immigrant support in 2006 by launching their party 
leaflet in various languages in order for EU citizens and “particularly the 20,000 Poles in the 
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capital” to understand their right to vote in both the Edinburgh Council and Scottish Parliament 
elections in May 2007 (BBC, 2006). In order to gain support for immigrant communities it is 
important to engage them in the political process.  The SNP touted the ideology that “regardless 
of the languages [spoken] all of the citizens of Edinburgh have the right to have their voices 
heard at the ballot box” (BBC, 2006). The brochures released in Polish, German, French, 
Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, and Catalan removed an important linguistic barrier to 
political participation amongst immigrant voters.  
 Correspondingly, the efforts made by the SNP to appeal to the typical ‘labour supporting 
Scottish Muslim voters’ have been effective (Hepburn, 2011). Some minorities, such as Scottish 
Pakistanis, are now more likely to identify as Scottish rather than British (Hussain and Miller 
2006), which may affect how they voted in the referendum. Scottish Pakistanis actually offered 
more support to the SNP than the average Scot as they were twice as likely to vote for them. In a 
study completed in 2006, the majority of the group revealed that they supported an independent 
Scotland (Hussain and Miller, 2006). The same study also stipulated that the “SNP’s welcoming 
political stance over the years and especially its opposition to the invasion of Iraq has made it 
even easier for [ethnic Pakistanis] to identify with Scotland” (Hussain and Miller, 2006: 169). 
The SNP’s welcoming endeavours have, therefore, made some immigrant groups more 
supportive of the independence movement.  
 In addition to the SNP’s involvement of immigrant groups in its electoral strategies, the 
party has promoted a progressive version of Scottish membership whereby “citizenship in 
Scotland would be based on an inclusive model designed to support economic growth, 
integration and promotion of diversity” (Scottish Government, 2009b: 5.13). In this vein, 
Scottish citizenship would be based on birth or residency, in which “everybody who is here 
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regardless of where they are from would qualify for citizenship” (SNP, 1997: 7). In contrast with 
the model that has ‘failed’ in the UK, the SNP has incorporated ‘multiculturalism’ as a keyword 
in its discourse about Scottish national identity (Leith, 2008).  The party has stated that ethnic 
minorities contribute to their national identity (SNP 2003a: 28). While the UK is distancing itself 
from the multiculturalism model, Scotland pursues a nation that is “sensitive to the needs of 
other communities which are a part of the rich tapestry of Scotland” (SNP, 1997: 17). While 
immigrants represent a small percentage of the electorate their involvement in the referendum 
process has still had an impact on campaign process and results, as will be noted in the 
subsequent section.  
 The preceding section has outlined the political landscape in Scotland prior to the 
independence referendum period. Interestingly, it appears that nationalism and the need for 
immigration in Scotland has risen at the same time in recent decades. The political context prior 
to the referendum highlights the strong support for the SNP and independence amongst some 
immigrants, while also exemplifying the relationship between Scotland and the UK. There is no 
doubt that the SNP’s electoral strategy catered to immigrant groups and more progressive voters 
and was continued throughout the independence referendum period. 
6.2 A Referendum on Scottish Independence 	
 Held on September 18, 2014, the Scottish Referendum resulted in an unprecedented 84.6 
percent voter turnout.  The pro-independence forces were organized under the 'Yes Scotland' 
organizational umbrella (led mainly by the SNP), while Better Together was the main campaign 
group in favour of staying a part of the UK. Under Better Together, the No campaign won with 
55 percent of the vote, while the Yes side garnered 45 percent.  
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  While the voting period took place in the preceding four weeks, planning for the 
referendum began in November 2013 with the passage of the Scottish Independence Referendum 
Bill. With the passage of this Bill, the Scottish Government, under the SNP, produced a 670 page 
White Paper entitled Scotland’s Future, which outlined the advantages of independence in 
addition to how Scotland may look if it were to become an independent country. The White 
Paper upheld by Nicola Sturgeon (then Deputy First Minister)in Scottish Parliament as "the 
opportunities of independence, the benefits for individuals, families, communities and the nation 
as a whole and the practicalities of how we move from a Yes vote in September next year to 
becoming an independent country in March 2016” (Scottish Government, 2013). This document 
outlined specific items with regards to immigration and citizenship. The White Paper had already 
set the tone for the inclusion of immigrants in the referendum process, particular to pro-
independence campaign when the Scottish Independence Referendum Act was enacted between 
the Scottish and UK governments.   
 Specific to immigration, the White Paper discussed an approach that would better suit the 
Scottish region.  In particular, the SNP hoped to “reverse some of the decisions taken by 
Westminster which are damaging the ability of Scotland's colleges and universities to attract 
high-quality international students” (Scottish Government, 2013: 11).  Furthermore, the 
document argued that it would be “difficult to conceive of a Scottish government that would ever 
adopt the crude ‘go home’ approach tried by the current Westminster Government” (Scottish 
Government, 2013: 11). The document cites Westminster’s ‘go home’ attitude multiple times 
throughout the document, as well as referring to the UK’s “aggressive approach to immigration, 
asylum seekers and refugees” (Scottish Government, 2013: 11). Evidently, the Scottish 
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government in its White Paper was inferring that their approach would be more welcoming, and 
inclusive towards immigrants.  
  With regards to citizenship, independence would give Scotland autonomy and “the 
power to determine rules on citizenship and nationality” (Scottish Government, 2013: 11). 
Therefore, Scotland proposed an inclusive model where people could maintain multiple 
identities, including their previous national identity as well as their new Scottish identity. 
Importantly, “a commitment to a multi-cultural Scotland” was to be considered as “a cornerstone 
of the nation on independence” (Scottish Government, 2013: 11). 
 The plan would offer citizenship to British citizens living in the Scotland and those who 
hold dual citizenship with other countries, as well as Scottish born British citizens that lived 
outside of Scotland. Moreover, those not in these categories would also be able to apply. For 
instance, those with a parent or grandparent who qualified for Scottish citizenship would then 
qualify themselves. Those who also had a “demonstrable connection to Scotland” and had spent 
at least ten years living there at some point in their life would also be able to apply (Scottish 
Government, 2013: 11).  Certain immigrants on qualifying visas would also have the opportunity 
to apply for naturalisation as a Scottish citizen. These stipulations highlighted a commitment 
from the SNP to maintain an inclusive society; even though it was unclear how easy it would be 
for various types of immigrants to qualify or become citizens once they applied. Importantly, this 
document was translated into 13 different languages spoken by the majority of newcomers (and 
long-time immigrants) in Scotland. The translation of the document highlights another way in 
which the SNP promoted an inclusive Scotland and catered to the immigrant vote.  
 Discursive evidence throughout the referendum period highlights the same mentality 
from the SNP. Throughout the campaign many of the themes found within the White Paper were 
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used to appeal to immigrant voters. In June 2014, three months before the vote, the Yes campaign 
saw an increase in support for independence among minority groups, with one radio poll 
presenting that 64 percent were in favour (Elgot, 2014). First Minister and SNP Leader Alex 
Salmond stated that immigration was used as a "weapon" to fuel anxieties about Scottish 
independence by those against it (Brooks, 2014). Salmond denounced opposition parties for 
“pandering" to UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) instead of upending anti-
immigration rhetoric (Brooks, 2014) as most had done previously. Furthermore, when shadow 
home secretary Yvette Cooper criticized the SNP’s plans to loosen immigration controls, 
Christian Allard stated that  "Yvette Cooper's rhetoric on immigration is also deeply worrying 
and yet another example of how UKIP is dictating Westminster's agenda – despite the party 
being completely irrelevant in Scotland"(Carrell, 2014). Throughout its Yes campaign the SNP 
attempted to garner the immigrant voter support while distancing itself from the UK central 
policies. 
 While immigrant voters (particularly those from outside the UK) may have perceived 
Holyrood (under the SNP) as more welcoming than Westminster (due to some of the anti-
immigrant rhetoric voice by UKIP), in the months leading up to the vote not all were convinced 
independence was the best choice. In a poll conducted by YouGov in the weeks before the vote  
a two percent lead was forecasted for the Yes side among voters born in Scotland, while the No 
vote led 69 to 31 percent among those born in the rest of the UK and a 58 to 42 percent lead 
among those born in other countries. It was therefore not surprising that the immigrant vote was 
further courted by the SNP in the following weeks as in the anecdotal evidence observed among 
immigrants to Scotland.  
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 Discursive and quantitative evidence from immigrant voters in the week before the 
September 18 independence referendum showed a divide in support for and against 
independence. Many voiced economic uncertainty as reasons to stay a part of the UK, such as 
shop owners (many of whom are Pakistani) who were worried that “It’s not the right time. We 
don’t have the resources…They’re asking us to follow them into the darkness.”  Others simple 
enjoyed being part of the United Kingdom, such as one person who stated that: “I like to be 
Scottish but part of the U.K. I don’t think there is anything wrong with that” (De Bode, 2014), as 
well as being part of the EU and Common Travel Area. However, many other groups and 
individuals did support independence.  
  A study by the Centre of Dynamics of Ethnicity conducted during the referendum period 
highlighted that the way people perceived ‘Scottishness’ from ‘Britishness’ may have played a 
lead role in the voting results, as the SNP tried to differentiate Scottish society with its 
immigrant-friendly policies and rhetoric from the rest of the United Kingdom (CoDE, 2014). In 
the week before the vote, at least one poll had shown (for the first time) the Yes side with a 
narrow lead (CoDE, 2014). While the same study could not predict how immigrant communities 
would vote, it demonstrated that Scotland’s Pakistani immigrants were almost twice as likely to 
identify as Scottish as England’s Pakistani immigrants were to identify as English. Furthermore, 
the study showed that Scottishness was perceived as “more inclusive” than the English identity 
for many ethnic groups (CoDE, 2014). Many minorities viewed “Englishness as a white-only 
identity,” while immigrants living in Scotland feel the country’s identity is more 
“inclusive”(CoDE, 2014).  This is an important trend especially in regards to framing; if minority 
groups are framed as part of the nationalist fabric then they will feel part of the fabric and they 
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should vote accordingly, especially if they feel like the rest of the UK does not accept them to 
the same degree.  
 The spokesperson for Scots Asians for Yes stipulated that many were encouraged to 
favour the idea of an independent Scotland based on the hostility created towards their 
community from the UK’s failing foreign policy in the Middle East (De Bode, 2014).  Such 
minority supported sub-groups were common throughout the Scottish independence campaign. 
The SNP and the independence movement had the unique support of immigrant groups such as 
Polish for Yes, Italians for Si (Yes), Africans for an Independent Scotland, as well as multiple 
Asian-immigrant led independence groups. The involvement of these groups in the referendum 
process sets Scotland apart from the other case studies, while also alluding to the inclusive 
atmosphere that was part of the Scottish nationalist project.  
 The rhetoric created by these immigrant groups contributed to the discourse that can be 
analyzed throughout the referendum process. Evidently, their own cultural and political 
experiences are brought into their campaign for an independent Scotland. For instance, the 
members of ‘Yes Scotland Hong Kong’ group may be more sympathetic to Scottish 
independence given their own political history.  For some African migrants, the referendum 
encouraged minorities to take part in Scottish politics. Some believed that “with a yes vote, 
changes will happen to all those who are in Scotland, especially ethnic minorities who have 
come as immigrants, who have nowhere they can call home. They’ll start calling this place their 
home"(Ng, 2014). Others felt that “often as immigrants [they] are challenged to engage with the 
mainstream, so [they thought it was] very, very important for people from ethnic minority groups 
to engage with this kind of referendum and the debate and the decision making” (Ng, 2014). The 
incorporation of minority groups into the sovereignty movement speaks to their importance in 
		 92	
the independence referendum process.  Similar to the Catalonia case, the same ‘emotion 
contagion’ can be seen in the immigrant populations in Scotland but to an even greater extent. To 
this end, through interactions with sovereigntist groups in Scotland, immigrants adapted the same 
nationalist zeal or through connecting with anti-independence groups they adopted the same anti-
independence ardour. 
 Pro and anti- independence groups were also active on social media in their pursuit. The 
use of social media is an interesting aspect used in the Scottish case. Social media was also used 
throughout the Catalonia campaign, but not in the Quebec case. In the case of the Quebec, the 
lack of availability of such technological mediums in 1995 is an obvious deterrent. While the 
impact of its use extends beyond the research of this thesis, I mention it here as the use of social 
media contributed to public participation in the movement. An example of this was noted near 
the end of the voting period when the Italians for Yes group dismissed the No campaign’s latest 
promise to devolve more power to Scotland if they remained in the union by stating on twitter: 
“The No campaign is doing a Berlusconi — bribing the electorate a few days before the vote. 
Don't fall for it Scotland #VoteYes”. By the same token, however, promises are part of the 
election game and both the No and Yes campaigns played accordingly.  
 As is common in most political campaigns, the referendum campaign was not without 
controversy.  Claims were made that No activists attempted to garner pro-union support in the 
Polish community by warning Polish and other EU nationals that they would be forced to leave 
the country if Scotland became independent as they would no longer be protected by EU free 
movement of people laws (McArdle, 2014). The pro-independence groups condemned such 
anxiety-inducing manoeuvres. Polish for Yes and lobbyists for independence demanded that the 
No campaign apologise for creating fear and panic among Polish families (McArdle, 2014).  
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Notably, membership of the EU was a salient issue in the referendum debate. While the Scottish 
Government insisted it could negotiate entry as an existing member state within 18 months of 
independencexx, the Pro-Union lobbyists indicated that an independent Scotland would have to 
apply for re-entry, which could take significantly longerxxi. Elected members of the SNP also 
spoke out about these claims as Humza Yousaf, Minister for External Affairs, stated that the 
government is committed to Scotland's European migrants and an independent Scotland will be 
part of the European Union, therefore the freedom of movement between Scotland and all EU 
countries would continue (McArdle, 2014).  
 Although the issue of immigration was not as salient to Scottish voters, it remained one 
of the main cleavages between the Yes and the No camps (Hepburn, 2015). As noted, the Scottish 
Government had previously promoted their vision for an inclusive and multicultural model of 
citizenship in an independent Scotland.  This position on immigration compares with “the SNP’s 
self-perception as a democratically inclusive party” (Hepburn, 2015). While the SNP’s 
commitment to multiculturalism contrasts largely with the “neo-assimilationist approach of the 
UK government” its vision for a multicultural Scotland does not differ from the views of the No 
Camp (Lewis and Craig, 2014). The No camp did not seek to contest the Yes camp on concepts 
of multiculturalism but instead targeted issues relating to immigration control. No lobbyists 
highlighted the detriments that a liberal immigration system could bring, not to Scotland itself, 
but to the rest of the United Kingdom.  The issue of immigration in the Scottish independence 
referendum period was mainly contested between the Scottish and the British Governments, or 
rather the Yes supporters, led by the SNP, contending against the unionist parties in Scotland 
(Hepburn, 2015). As noted in a previous section the comparable rhetorical approaches to 
immigration used by all parties in Scotland could explain this occurrence.  
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 Two weeks before the September 18th referendum, the polls showed non-Britons 
favouring the No campaign, but by a smaller margin than Britons born outside of Scotland 
(Brooks, 2014). Therefore, Alex Salmond held a rally in Edinburgh targeted at immigrants 
voters. Pictures of the event depicted various individuals holding signs with vote “Yes” in 
various languages. This rally was part of a concentrated effort to gain the last bit of foreign vote 
support possible. Furthermore, First and Deputy First Ministers, Alex Salmond and Nicola 
Sturgeon, delivered their final plea for Yes to hundreds of people from the city’s African and 
South Asian communities just three days before the final vote at Glasgow’s Central mosque. 
Salmond and Sturgeon’s discourse remained positive and inclusive. Sturgeon began by stating: 
“I don’t care where you have come from… If you choose to make Scotland your home and you 
do this country the privilege of making it your home, then you have as much say in the future of 
our country as anyone else"(Ng, 2014).  
 Sturgeon’s sentiments were echoed by Salmond in a statement suggesting that Scotland 
“will have a country that will be concerned not just with economic prosperity, but social justice, 
and embrace every single one of [their] communities in what we describe as the great tartan of 
Scotland…That’s why [he is] absolutely confident that whatever else happens, the majority of 
Africans, the majority of Asians, the majority of people who come from a variety of Scotland’s 
will vote yes to independence” (Ng, 2014). Similar discourse could be noted throughout the 
independence referendum process. 
 Despite efforts made by the SNP, the polls continued to show the immigrant vote divided, 
which is, notably, still impressive level of support when compared to what I derive from the 
Quebec case. The rhetoric, however, never became negative.  With a sufficient number of 
immigrants supporting the cause, it would have been very imprudent to do otherwise. While the 
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Yes campaign lost the referendum, the immigrant vote was so closely divided they could not be 
‘blamed’ for the loss as in the Quebec case, nor would they have been based on the inclusive 
discourse cemented throughout the independence referendum process.   
 When the results were tallied immigrants were not targeted but instead incorporated into 
the feelings of disappointment echoed by the Yes camp, as they had been incorporated and 
welcomed into the sovereignty movement. To this end,  SNP MSP Christian Allard is quoted as 
saying that “Scotland is the country of everyone who lives here, regardless of where they were 
born, and we take decisions on our future together… the diversity of Scotland’s population is a 
matter for celebration.. While we were disappointed with the result of the referendum, this study 
shows that a clear legacy has been greater political involvement, particularly among young 
people… And that is something to be proud of” (Clegg, 2015). Moreover, in my research I was 
taxed to find any accounts of negative discourse by the SNP in recent years or any at all by the 
first minister and deputy minster at the time of the referendum in regards to views on 
immigration. This lack of negative discourse has shown Scotland and the SNP as an outlier 
among the case studies. 
 In regards to immigrant voting behaviour, a study on the voting patterns of Polish 
immigrants in the referendum highlights the importance of attachment (Piętka-Nykazaa and 
McGhee, 2015). As the immigrant group with the largest population, Polish nationals may have 
more of an impact on voting outcomes than other immigrant groups.  The findings in this study 
also denote the concept being an important aspect in immigrant political participation. For 
example, the intention to stay in Scotland along with substantive attachments (social, economic 
and relational or familial) to the region were engaging factors to the Polish nationals involvement 
in the referendum vote (Piętka-Nykazaa and McGhee, 2015).  
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 While my thesis focuses on political discourse, public opinion also has an effect on the 
immigrant vote. Some studies (Migration Observatory ,2014; and McCollom, Nowok, and Tidal, 
2014) have inferred that public opinion in Scotland, with regards to immigration, is actually 
much closer to that of the UK than SNP politicians have vocalized. To this end, public opinion 
could have an impact on the divide in the immigrant vote.  The reports reveal that general 
attitudes to immigration in Scotland are less negative than in the rest of Britain, but they also 
reveal that public opinion is distinguished based on the type of immigrant. For example, those 
coming from the Middle East may be viewed less favourably than those coming from elsewhere 
in Europe. There are decidedly different attitudes toward various sub-groups and categories of 
immigrants in Scotland. Moreover, the reports note a complicated relationship between 
immigration attitudes and constitutional issues that extends well beyond the capacity of this 
thesis. Ultimately, an analysis of public opinion outspreads the focus of this thesis, but it is 
worthy of mentioning as a point for further research.  
 The Scottish independence referendum highlights an important connection between 
political discourse and the way in which immigrants vote. As it did in Catalonia, the 
independence referendum process created a bond among all those living in Scotland while 
allowing for the political socialization of immigrant groups.  The next section offers some insight 
into the implications of the immigrant involvement in the sovereignty movement in Scotland and 
the political developments of the SNP after the independence referendum process.  
6. 3 The Post-Referendum Period 	
 Despite the disappointing results for Yes campaigners, the results were accepted with 
dignity on all sides. While ‘New Scots’ were not specifically thanked for their efforts in the 
movement, they were not demonized either. In fact, the only blame placed was on the No 
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campaign’s last minute promises to pursue further devolution for Scotland. There is no need in 
Scotland to specifically thank a group of people that have been so well incorporated into both 
sides of the movement.  Following the referendum, elected officials used inclusive language that 
brought all Scots together. Indeed, divisive rhetoric was not commonly observed in any of the 
materials I analyzed in the post-referendum period.  The language used in the campaigns, on 
both sides, was about being together. While on the Yes side, those were encouraged to come 
together for an independent Scotland, the campaign Better Together on the No side denotes 
double significance. 
 In Alex Salmond’s speech, on the final outcome of the referendum, he thanked those who 
voted for independence. More importantly, Salmond wanted to bring all Scots together by 
acknowledging the region’s commitment to the political process with the highest voter turnout 
“in the democratic world for any election or any referendum in history” (Salmond, 2014). Such 
involvement in the referendum vote was upheld as a victory for the democratic institutions that 
exist within the country.  Salmond also used inclusive words, such as ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘friends’ in his 
speech, denoting the importance of togetherness despite the results (Salmond, 2014). Notable to 
my thesis, was Salmond’s reference to the involvement of “new sections of the community” in 
the referendum campaign (Salmond, 2014). While not specifically highlighting the involvement 
of immigrants, one could infer that “the touched sections of the community who’ve never before 
been touched by politics” (Salmond, 2014) could be a reference to immigrant groups. 
Furthermore, Salmond touts the participation of these sections of the community to have 
influenced both his party and the political process. 
 Following the Scottish Referendum, the same inclusive rhetoric can be observed by the 
SNP. In fact, since the referendum, SNP party membership has more than quadrupled and overall 
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electoral support for the party has risen. In the last UK Federal Election the SNP won 56 of 
Scotland’s 59 Westminster seats and they are currently the largest supported party in local 
government (Stuart, 2014).  Notably, predictions made in my hypotheses can help to explain the 
rise in support of the SNP. The rise in support for the SNP compliments the continuation of the 
progressive rhetoric that is shared by the SNP, particularly with regards to immigration. The 
discourse articulated by the SNP throughout the referendum is locked-in and the same rhetoric is 
continued thereafter. Thus, the progressive rhetoric and policies favoured by the SNP become the 
status quo, especially as support for the party continues to rise. Furthermore, after the 
referendum the SNP continued to push the UK on its failing immigration policy, denoting an 
important trend in migration politics in the region.   
 Scottish ministers particularly insisted that the UK government reinstate work visas for 
foreign students after a study revealed that nearly half of all migrants to Scotland had been 
educated to degree level or higher. Humza Yousaf, the Scottish government’s Minister for 
Europe and International Development, has spoken about the way in which the UK “immigration 
policy is currently too heavily influenced by the priorities of the South-East of England, based on 
the values of the current UK government and driven by a desire to reduce the numbers of 
incoming migrants which does not recognise Scotland’s needs and does not serve their economic 
or societal interests” (Carrell, 2015).  Similar discourse was found throughout the UK general 
election as the SNP has stated that they would only “support immigration policies that meet 
Scotland's economic needs; seek the reintroduction of the post study work visa; and, review 
current immigration detention system and regime, in order to deliver a fairer and more effective 
system”  (BBC, 2015). Evidently, the SNP could be pushing a pro-immigration strategy in order 
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to strengthen their economy, but regardless the party continues to create positive political 
discourse towards immigration as a result.  
 More recently, the SNP has challenged the UK government on its ‘inhumane’ treatment 
of asylum seekers. The motion particularly referred to a specific dawn raid on a family of asylum 
seekers in Glasgow, June 2015 and more generally to a motion on closure of the Dungavel 
Detention Centre, that is located in Scotland but of which Scotland has no jurisdiction over. The 
MP for Glasgow East has insisted that the rights of asylum seekers are high on the SNP’s 
agenda. Other members of the SNP are also active in this message, such as the SNP 
Spokesperson for Immigration, Asylum and Border Control, Stuart Macdonald. MacDonald was 
the one to propose the two motions in parliament that would better support asylum seekers. 
Another SNP member, Angus Robertson, publicly criticized the UK government’s lack of 
support for Syrian refugees and the migrant crisis, particularly with “migrants drowning in 
Mediterranean” (Paton, 2015). Advocating for a more suitable immigration system for Scotland, 
along with migrant rights, has become a regular part of the SNP rhetoric stemming from the 
lock-in after the referendum. 
 The foregoing case study demonstrates what happens because of the referendum process 
in Scotland. The first section of my case study outlined the political developments in Scotland in 
regards to immigration.  This section continued by outlining the relationship between nationalist 
parties and immigrants that would develop during the independence referendum process. The 
second section of the case study discussed the independence referendum period and highlighted 
an important point in Scottish Nationalism – the incorporation of immigrants in the Scottish 
identity. As seen in the Catalan study, the emotional connection created between Scots and 
immigrants throughout the referendum extends the case study beyond the civic and ethnic 
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nationalism into an analysis of political mobilization by the SNP and other nationalist factions in 
Scotland, and how these sentiments were locked in by the referendum period. The third section 
reviewed the post referendum period to understand how the referendum locked-in political 
discourse of the SNP offering tentative predictions for the future.   
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 This thesis has examined the link between independence referenda and minority 
nationalist discourses on immigration. I demonstrate in each case that the referendum period acts 
as lock-in mechanism that secures minority discourses about immigrants that were created by 
nationalist frames throughout the process. Importantly, the referenda played a role in the 
development of either an accepting or a sceptical narrative toward immigration. In Quebec, I 
note the development of a suspicious narrative toward immigration, whereas I observe a more 
accepting or accommodating rhetoric in the Catalan and Scottish cases. The aim of this research 
project is to answer the question if, without a referendum, the relationship between the 
nationalist movement and immigrant communities would be more fluid in each of the case 
studies presented. 
 The intersection of the cultural demands between minority nations and a diverse region 
showcases the role of the referenda in congealing minority nationalist attitudes towards 
immigrants. The preceding analysis has allowed me to highlight that without a referendum the 
minority nationalist views of immigrant communities would have remained more flexible. 
Further, each case demonstrates that the immigrant community position in the referenda 
(whether they are more or less favourably disposed toward independence) acts as the mechanism 
that locks in the minority nationalist discourses on immigrants. In other words, through the 
independence referenda immigrant identity frames presented by SSNP elites are locked-in.  This 
final chapter offers a synthesis of the findings from each case study. This allows the reader to 
understand how and to what extent the information presented in the case studies matches the 
hypotheses set out in Chapter 3. Through my research, I am able to identify notable theoretical 
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and policy implications of my study. I conclude by discussing these, along with the limitations of 
the study and areas for future research. 
  My work is premised on four claims that developed the theory of the independence 
referendum as a lock-in mechanism that secures SSNP political elite discourse toward 
immigrants into the minority region. The following paragraphs illustrate how the empirical data 
presented here fit with the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3. First, all SSNRs analyzed developed 
unique diversity policies in opposition to state immigration policies. Diversity management 
became an important part in the nation-building efforts for nationalist parties in Quebec, 
Catalonia, Scotland. While all three cases were limited by constitutional constraints in terms of 
how they could direct their own immigration policies, managing immigration and integration 
became an important nation-building tool, notably in contrast to the central state. For instance, 
Quebec SSNPs rejected the Canadian multicultural model for the use of its own policy of 
interculturalism. As noted, this rejection is based on the perception that multiculturalism was 
intended to undermine Quebec nationalist aspirations. As such, this perception has affected the 
way in which cultural communities are discussed in the region.  Further, Quebec offers 
intercultural education policies that are used to integrate immigrants into the French culture 
rather than link them to the Canadian English institutions. While in policy, the PQ view diversity 
as opportunity to build on the nation of Quebec as nation for all its residents, discursive 
examples noted point to the opposite.   
 In Catalonia, language is also a contentious issue as politicians attempt to encourage the 
use of Catalan to differ from the mainstream Spanish language and culture. As such, immigration 
has become a salient issue in Catalan national politics. Catalonia adopted more accommodating 
policies toward immigrants in contrast to the Spanish state in 2001. Importantly, this progressive 
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approach to immigration was continued throughout the 2003 elections and beyond, although 
party competition played a role in the creation of negative rhetoric, particularly from parties of 
the right but also from within the CiU. 
 The Scottish region has embraced diversity as an important building block to their 
national identity despite the central message of the UK that views immigration as a threat. The 
SNP have committed to pursue welcoming policies around immigration and all Scottish parties 
worked to spite British Government policies.  Therefore, the use of public policy in SSNRs is 
twofold. It has the expected function of providing necessities to the public, but it is also 
frequently used in order to build separate identity. Certainly, the dynamic between policies of the 
state and policies of SSNPs have a role in the development of nationalist discourse toward 
immigrants. With such divergent views on policies, independence becomes one of the most 
salient issue in SSNRs.  
 Second, an independence referendum represents an important period of political stress in 
each region identified here, where immigration becomes a more prominent topic. The 
referendum becomes the medium for the solidification of nationalist discourse toward 
immigrants, especially as the oppositional policies created by the nation- building process 
produce diversity practices wherein immigrants are percieved a certain way by the SSNRs. 
While the province of Quebec did offer some policies in efforts to integrate newcomers, it 
struggled to actually incorporate immigrants into the sovereinty movement, due to exclusiveness 
of the PQ and the BQ parties. In Catalonia, the CiU were somewhat successful in gaining 
supporters for the sovereignty movement yet discursive examples from main party advocates, 
such as Pujol and  Ferrusola, highlight the fragmentation in party views towards immigration. 
Scotland offers the clearest example of welcoming policies and discourses before the referendum 
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period especially as the dichomoty of us versus them was not noted in any of the discurisve 
examples presented here.  
 In Quebec, the minority region opposition results in more exclusive diveristy policies and 
in turn, the majority of immigrants appeared more supportive of the central 
government/preservation of the state.  In Scotland, the minority region opposition results in more 
inclusive policies and therefore immigrants appear more supportive of the independence 
movement. In Catalonia, the relationship between SSNRs and immigrant groups is complicated 
by regional party ties to the central state. However, under, the CiU, some inclusive (although 
assimilationalist) policies were presented and therefore immigrants appeared more supportive of 
independentist movement. Or rather, immigrants were so well integrated into the policital sphere 
such a distinction did not play a factor in the discourse. Further, the decision to allow all 
immigrants to vote in the independence referendum had unparalleled effects on their 
involvement in the referendum and, in turn the way in which they were framed by sub-state 
national parties in Catalonia. 
 Third, immigrant frames created by SSNPs prior to and during the independence 
referendum were relevent to the nationalist movements. In Quebec, immigrants were percieved 
as undermining self-determination for the minority nation whereas in Catalonia and Scotland 
immigrants were so well incorporated into the movement there was no need to frame them as 
outsiders; many simply voted along with previous party allegiances. Indeed, while there are 
some discursive examples from members of the CiU that denote negative attitudes towards 
immigrants prior to the referedum, there are none noted here during the Catalan independence 
referendum period. Immigrants in Scotland were usually framed as part of the Scottish national 
fabric, setting the region apart in the case studies analyzed here.  
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 The Catalan and Scottish cases highlight the important relationship formed between 
immigrants and minority nations by invovling the former in an important polical opportunity. 
Further, while political pandering to immigrant groups was noted in all cases, it’s effects were 
only noted in Catalonia and Scotland. SSNPs in the Catalan and Scotttish cases did make claims 
that immigrant groups would be better supported by an independent state. Immigrant groups in 
Quebecfelt they did not fit into the nationalist fabric. Further still, the Québécois majority 
seemed so caught up in the divide between French and English there was very little room for the 
allophone minority. Therefore, no promises were made to groups in anticipation of them 
supporting soverignty. Moreover, the referendum period seemed to open a chasm in the polticial 
divide between some immigrant groups and seperatists as noted above.  
  Fourth, how the minority nationalists’ perceived immigrant voting patterns in the 
referendum ultimately affected their attitudes toward immigrant communities after the 
referendum took place. These views were secured and normalized through the framing process 
and political articulation associated with the referendum period. This is especially true in the 
case of Quebec upon an analysis of policy and discourse development after the referendum 
period.  
 The Catalan and Scottish Case studies highlight the importance of political mobilization 
used by the nationalist parties. Separatist political parties in these regions have tried to socialize 
immigrants through the concept of belonging. In these two cases, the independence process 
becomes more about political mobilization than identity. Therefore, my work has implications 
for future studies that discuss the connection between immigration and minority regions by 
incorporating research on political mobilization. The referendum period in Quebec saw the 
widening of political divides between two community groups whereas the process in Catalonia 
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and Scotland seem to mirror modern social movements by incorporating marginalized groups 
into the political process. Notably, future research should consider analyzing the societal impact 
of referendums as social movements, especially the impact on typically marginalized groups.   
 Ultimately, my work provides a nuanced addition to the studies on nationalism and 
immigrations by examining the referenda as a lock-in mechanism. I add to the scholarship on 
nationalism in multinational states by introducing a novel approach to understanding the 
relationship between nationalist movements and immigrant groups under a time of political 
stress. However, while more extensive work could be done through content analysis, this study 
has sought to provide an introduction to the impact of referenda on nationalism and attitudes 
towards immigration. Future research should include more qualitative methodology, with a 
greater reliance on primary sources. Certainly, interviews with notable individuals involved in 
the referendum period would shed more light on perceptions of the time. Furthermore, the 
limited availability of quantitative information on voting patterns prevents me from making 
conclusive remarks about immigrant behaviour. However, perceptions of immigrant behaviour 
by minority regionalists groups, as noted in the cases study analysis, demonstrate that 
referendums due matter in terms of subsequent policy and discursive development. Notably, 
moments of political stress offer an interesting opportunity for researchers to examine how 
minorities are incorporated into society. As ‘othering’ becomes a part of the rhetoric on 
immigrants and refugees in certain areas of the contemporary, western world it is important to 
understand that this research offers starting point in discursive studies on the views of 
immigrants in minority regions.   
A final note should be made about the current world political climate in 2016. While I 
examined political developments in the regions until the end of 2015, this thesis was completed 
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at a particularly politically turbulent time.  Throughout the time I wrote my thesis, the world saw 
the rise of ISIS and the complexities of the Syrian crisis; which have created the biggest outflow 
of refugees since World War Two. While unprecedented terrorist attacks are becoming more 
prevalent throughout Western Europe, Britain exits the European Union. Moreover, the former 
Stephen Harper Administration in Canada used divisive political techniques to pit certain citizen 
groups against one another.  Certainly, the analysis of these factors has no place in my thesis but 
there is no doubt that these factors would have had an effect on global and minority regionalist’s 
perceptions. As Britain takes leave from the EU, one might analyze how this change could 
impact Scottish political rhetoric, especially with regards to its will to leave the UK. Did 
Québécois rhetoric towards immigration change based on the conservative ideals that were 
presented under Stephen Harper Administration? Moreover, will minority regions demand for 
more control over immigration, especially over a perceived type of immigrant? And, how will 
this affect their views on immigration?  
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Endnotes 
 
iThe independence referendum held in Catalonia was not a binding or even regional-government 
mandated referendum. It holds little constitutional weight but it is still important to the overall national 
movement in Catalonia (and relevant to this research) as it signifies the increasing desire for emancipation 
from the Spanish Kingdom in that SSNR.  
iiSee Carens, 1995;  2001; Kymlicka, 1995; 2001; and Baubock, 2001 
iiiI refer to framing literature as the works found in social movement literature, rather than in political 
behaviour literature. Particularly relevant is the work of Snow et al (1986) where I incorporate elements 
such as frame amplification which I see as the process where an interpretive frame has an effect “on a 
particular issue, problem, or set of events” (Snow et al., 1986, p. 469) through its “invigoration.” Other 
scholarship on framing, such as works by Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 2007, Goffman (1974), and Snow 
and Benford (1988) will also be outlined in the following sections.	
ivThe former coalition between the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) and the Democratic 
Union of Catalonia, which broke up in June of 2015, led by Artur Mas.  
vNotably, hostility may also come from 'below', from the general population, but such an analysis extends 
beyond the confines of my work. 
viI define referendums in this context as an extension of the state’s institutions and therefore analyses it as 
an institution itself.  
viiPolitical articulation refers to images and views conveyed by political representatives.   
viiiviiiThe “medium is the message” is a term coined by Marshall Macluhan first introduced in his book 
Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (1964). Macluhan states that it is the medium itself that 
should be the focus of study rather than solely the content. I analyse both the medium (the referendum) 
and the content (the discourse) in my study.  
ix Notably, the informal referendum in 2014 was not the last word on independence in Catalonia. Indeed,  
the subsequent 2015 election was supposed to be a plebiscitary one to initiate the process of secession. x	Notably, this thesis focuses on the relationship between newcomers to the country and nationalist 
movements. Notably, internal migrants, i.e. Canadian citizens moving from Toronto to Montreal (in the 
Quebec case); Welsh and/or Irish individuals moving to Scotland; or Andalusians moving to Catalonia 
are not the primary focus of this study. The Anglophones discussed in the Quebec case are unique, as 
many have been in Quebec since it’s inception and I do not consider them part of the newcomers 
discussed. I include them in my discussion as political actors mention them, as Anglophones are not 
considered part of the French nationalist fabric of Quebec akin to many immigrants. Further, internal and 
international migrants are distinct actors with different access to resources: while one is a regional 
‘minority’ the other is a ‘double minority’. I focus only on the latter as they seem to have the biggest 
impact on political rhetoric analysed here yet the cultural differences the former bring in is not ignored 
but is saved for further research opportunities.  
xi The official term for non-white groups in Canada; in contrast Quebec uses the term ‘‘cultural 
communities’’.  
xiiAnother term used to describe old stock Quebeckers. 
xiii Much of this was decided between negotiations between the Federal Government of Canada and the 
main political parties in Quebec, led by Jacques Parizeau (PQ), Lucien Bouchard (BQ) and Mario 
Dumont (ADQ) and was put into agreement on June 12, 1995. 
xivThe federal Bloc Québécois party has important ties to the provincial Parti Québécois, and had obvious 
intentions in the support of the 1995 independence referendum. Therefore, I take into account the actions 
of their party members as if they were a part of the Sub-State Nationalist Regional party. 
xv It was in power again in 2010 up until 2015 when the coalition party was dissolved. 
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xvi Various constitutional battles have played out over time between the Spain Government and Catalonia, 
as was witnessed even in the case of the (unconstitutional, non-binding) independence referendum. 
xviiJordi Pujol was the leader of the party Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) from 1974 to 
2003, and President of the Generalitat de Catalunya from 1980 to 2003 under the CiU label. 
xviii Since its inception in 1934, the SNP has remained one of the leading parties in Scotland.  The main 
goal of the SNP has been independence for Scotland from the UK. Integral in the fight for Scottish 
devolution, the SNP became the official opposition of the newly formed Scottish Parliament in 1999. The 
SNP has formed the minority government between 2007 and 2011, and subsequently has governed up 
until the publication of this thesis as a majority government.  
xix Subsequently, the United Kingdom’s turn to a more restrictive points-based immigration system 
eradicated the limited capacities that Scotland appreciated under Fresh Talent. While Scottish 
governments continued to lobby for flexibility in applying immigration rules, Ministers and the Home 
Office were not receptive. 
xx Based on Article 48 of the Treaties of the European Union 
xxi In reality, the No side stated that it could take up to a few years without a guaranteed membership at 
the end, based on using Article 49 of the Treaties of the European Union.	
